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Foreword
Since the late 1990s, Uganda has been undertaking an ambitious program to 
reduce national poverty, emphasizing pro-poor service delivery and promoting 
equitable economic growth. The urban water sector, specifically, has been the 
focus of wide-ranging reforms targeted at reaching the poor.
At the institutional level, the national public water authority responsible for service
delivery in Uganda’s towns and cities - National Water and Sewerage 
Corporation (NWSC) - has been implementing a raft of policies explicitly focused 
on improving delivery of services to the urban poor.
This study examines the extent to which these reforms have increased water 
coverage within Kampala City, specifically in informal settlements where the 
majority of poor households reside.
This collaborative effort by the World Bank and NWSC seeks to identify and 
document what works and what does not in reform measures aimed at reaching 
the poor, and highlights the gains and challenges of making service delivery 
pro-poor and managing service delivery reform to improve effectiveness and 
accessibility.
We hope that this knowledge will contribute more insights to guide reforms 
aimed at improving access to basic services by the poor, and enhance the 
effectiveness of pro-poor mechanisms employed in the urban water sector.
Jamal Saghir
Director
Sustainable Development Department
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Executive Summary
Background
The Government of Uganda (GoU) has 
undertaken a wide range of reforms in the urban 
water sector since the inception of the Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1997 (updated 
in 2000 and 2004). 
The PEAP provided a framework for development 
of multisector targets and investment 
programs at national, district, and local levels. 
Implementation of the PEAP included the 
development of detailed sector strategies and 
programs which were supported by the GoU’s 
development partners, including the World Bank, 
via Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits.
In 2004, the Ministry of Water and Environment 
(MoWE) unveiled a policy to expand water supply 
services to the poor in urban as well as rural 
areas. This was updated in 2006. The policy set 
the target of 100 percent coverage for water 
supply and sanitation (WSS) services in urban 
areas by 2015. 
In response to the policy, in 2004 the National 
Water and Sewerage Corporation, (NWSC) which 
is responsible  for service delivery in Kampala, 
undertook a series of measures to implement the 
pro-poor policy in urban areas. 
This case study assesses the impact of pro-poor 
measures implemented by NWSC in Kampala 
since 2004, identifies the key factors that affected 
the outcomes of these policies and strategies, 
proposes areas for improvement, and identifies 
lessons that can be learned and shared from 
the experience in Uganda. The primary purpose 
of the case study is to expand the scope and 
increase the effectiveness of NWSC’s pro-poor 
policy which is described below.
1 MoWE. 2011. Uganda Water and Environment Sector Performance Report 2011. 
Description of Pro-poor Measures
i. An Affordable Connections Policy, to 
increase coverage in all NWSC areas 
(in particular, the poor settlements) by 
lowering the cost of the connection fee 
for any customer (domestic and non-
domestic) living within 50 meters of the 
water mains. This policy was to be funded 
through an 11 percent surcharge in the 
average water supply tariff, to be collected 
and ring-fenced into a New Connections 
Fund. 
ii. A Pro-Poor Tariff Policy, which shifted the 
uniform tariff structure for all consumers 
to a differentiated structure for (i) domestic 
(ii) non domestic  customers, and (iii) 
public water points (PWPs). This means 
that there is a specific tariff for each of 
the NWSC’s customer categories across 
all water supply areas: industrial and 
commercial, government and institutional, 
and domestic. An additional tariff was 
developed specifically for PWPs. The 
MoWE considers that the differentiated 
tariff structure per customer category 
ensures equity in the supply and pricing.1 
iii. A Pro-Poor Targeting Project, which the 
NWSC is implementing since 2008 with 
support from the Global Partnership for 
Output-Based Aid (GPOBA) to subsidize 
water supply connections (including 
shared yard taps and prepaid PWPs/
kiosks) in specific poor settlements of 
Kampala.
To deliver these policies, the NWSC adopted two 
main delivery mechanisms: first, it established 
a pro-poor branch and, second, it provided 
vmultiple levels of service. An Urban Pro-Poor unit 
was set up and staffed in 2007 to promote, plan 
and support water supply and sanitation service 
expansion in poor unserved settlements of 
Kampala. Multiple levels of service were provided 
to new domestic customers, including a choice 
of individual house connections, PWPs/kiosks, 
and shared yard taps. In 2008 the NWSC started 
pilot-testing prepaid PWPs/kiosks. Community 
participation and demand creation for shared 
yard taps and prepaid PWPs/kiosk pilot-tested 
in the GPOBA project have now become the 
NWSC’s approach to expanding services in all 
unserved areas. 
On the whole, the pro-poor policy and program 
have led to a rapid expansion of services to poor 
households. Specifically, 2,405 new yard taps 
and 663 PWPs serving an estimated 81,000 
people were realized. A number of difficulties 
and challenges, nevertheless, emerged during 
implementation. The World Bank, the Water and 
Sanitation Program and the NWSC collaborated 
in preparing this case to draw lessons from 
this experience, and inform replication of good 
approaches at scale.
Summary of Key Challenges Identified
i. The discounted cost of household 
connections at UGX59,000 or $35 in 
2004 is still considered a significant 
barrier to access for poor households, as 
it represents 74 percent of the average 
monthly income of poor households  and 
is therefore beyond the reach of some 
households.
ii. The water tariff is affordable for poor 
households, but the level of subsidy 
reaching the poorest is very low. It is 
estimated at UGX2,600 ($1.3) per capita 
per annum for users of PWPs, compared 
to UGX10,300 ($5.1) per capita for house 
connections. This is mainly due to the fact 
that poor households share connections 
and use relatively low volumes of water 
(average consumption is 20 liters per 
capita per day). 
iii. Nonpayment of water bills by households 
and PWP/kiosk operators is causing a 
significant number of disconnections: 21 
percent of yard taps and 53 percent of 
PWPs. Although it is being addressed by 
the NWSC’s Urban Pro-Poor Branch, this 
significantly undermines any effort by the 
NWSC and its partners to expand services 
into poor settlements at scale using yard 
taps and PWPs. 
iv. The NWSC did not set up a dedicated and 
adequately ring-fenced New Connection 
Fund in spite of the fact that this was a 
key element of its Affordable Connections 
Policy. As a result, the funds collected 
for the Affordable Connection Policy 
through an 11 percent tariff surcharge 
were diverted to the funding of regular 
operational activities. 
v. Water mains extensions in poor 
settlements were, and are still, carried 
out on a piecemeal, project by project 
basis because Kampala Water has no 
clearly defined strategic business plan 
that identifies total investment needs and 
revenue/funding requirements over the 
long term. 
Summary of Key Findings
Overall, in spite of the these challenges, the case 
study finds that the pro-poor policy has largely 
been successful due to the following factors:
i. Improved financial sustainability: The 
NWSC’s broad-based policy has allowed 
the utility to significantly improve access to 
services, while also improving its financial 
viability through the more than doubling 
of connections and tripling of revenue 
between 2004 and 2010. Achieving 
financial sustainability is essential 
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for utilities to realistically serve poor 
households at scale. However, utilities also 
need to undertake targeted programs to 
reach the poor. 
ii. Improved operational efficiency: Increased 
efficiency of operations has enabled 
the NWSC to plan for, procure, and 
manage services for a growing number 
of customers. This entailed employing 
more and better trained staff; setting key 
performance contracts with staff and 
with internal independently managed 
water supply operations; applying for 
and obtaining an effective tariff structure; 
installing a new customer billing and 
revenue management system; improving 
community liaison and customer care; 
and improving procurement and works 
management systems. 
iii. More affordable connections: The 
Affordable Connection Policy increased the 
number of connections in Kampala across 
the board. Although it was designed 
to increase coverage in poor, unserved 
areas, the NWSC broadened coverage 
of the Affordable Connections Policy to 
non-poor domestic, government and 
industrial customers as well. As a result, 
NWSC’s  rapid increase in connections 
from  59,000 in 2004 to 146,000 in 2009, 
(on average 14,700 new connections per 
year), led to an increase from 64 percent 
to 72 percent increase in water supply 
coverage. 2,500 yard taps and 660 PWPs 
were installed in poor settlements due to 
the policy.2 This represents approximately 
4.3 percent of the total new connections 
made between 2004 and 2010.3 These 
new, predominantly shared connections 
have benefited 21 percent of the 466,000 
additional people served through the 
policy.  
iv. Increased access to PWPs: The poorest 
consumers in Kampala are currently 
served by PWPs/kiosks. The National 
Service Delivery Survey (NSDS, 2008) 
showed that 26 percent of the population 
was served by a public tap (PWP/kiosk, 
Presidential taps) in 2008. The three-fold 
increase in the number of public taps, as 
well as expansion of shared connections 
(predominantly yard taps) in poor areas, 
therefore, helped increase access by the 
poor. This also led to a reduction in the 
number of privately managed water points, 
selling water at a significantly higher price.
v. Creation of a pro-poor branch: The 
creation of an organizational structure 
and institutional mechanism to initiate, 
facilitate, continuously monitor and 
promote pro-poor initiatives, update MIS, 
and coordinate the activities of different 
interest groups (including the NWSC’s own 
operational branches) and organizations 
was a very positive step. This allowed 
dedicated personnel of the NWSC to 
concentrate on pro-poor activities, a focus 
that the organization lacked earlier. The 
pro-poor branch was directly responsible 
for improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the NWSC’s programs in poor 
settlements by reducing the proportion 
of inactive PWPs and yard taps from 
40 percent in 2007 (when the pro-poor 
branch was created) to less than 10 
percent in 2009. 
vi. An affordable tariff: The tariff was made 
more affordable to poor households by 
introducing three different measures: First, 
different rates were set for all customer 
groups; a specific rate for standposts 
which was also applied to yard taps, if 
these are shown to serve more than three 
households. Second, a cross-subsidy 
2  In total 6,000 yard taps and 1,000 public standposts were constructed in poor settlements from 2004 to 2010. However, approximately 700 yard taps and 60 PWPs 
were already being constructed every year before the policy. These baseline figures have not been included in the estimate of the additional connections that can be 
attributed to the Affordable Connections Policy only. 
3  If the baseline number of new connections per year had been included the total number of connections made in poor settlements would represent 9.5 percent of the 
total number of connections made since the Affordable Connections Policy was implemented (that is, over the period 2004–09).
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between different customer categories 
(for example domestic, government/
institutional and commercial/industrial. The 
third was the 11 percent surcharge in the 
tariff to fund new connections. 
vii. Geographical targeting: With support 
from GPOBA, output-based subsidies 
are being provided against delivery of 
prepaid PWPs and yard taps. Although 
progress has been slow, the approach 
shows that geographical targeting of 
poor households and performance-based 
subsidies offer significant opportunities to 
increase coverage (including volumes of 
water sold and thus financial sustainability) 
in poor, unserved, areas. The GPOBA 
project is expected to connect 400,000 of 
Kampala’s poor. 
viii. Prepaid water metering: A careful and 
well-thought through introduction of 
prepaid water meters at PWPs has led to 
its widespread acceptance by consumers, 
politicians, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), and even the press. This has 
largely eliminated the middlemen in water 
supplies and made water affordable at the 
official NWSC price. Currently only 4,500 
people have access to prepaid meters 
but the NWSC’s intention is replicate their 
adoption at scale, eventually reaching 75 
percent of the poor.
Recommendations on measures to address 
challenges and build on the above findings are 
presented below:
Recommendations
Recommendations are divided into the 
following categories: measures which NWSC 
can implement on their own; those they can 
implement with the support and/or approval 
of the government; and those that are beyond 
NWSC’s direct control or influence. 
I. Recommendations that the NWSC can 
implement on its own:
i. The NWSC and its partners should 
develop a long-term strategic business 
plan: Investments in network expansion 
have, to date, been piecemeal and on a 
project-by-project approach due to the 
lack of a long-term strategic business 
plan for Kampala. A long-term business 
plan which coherently identifies needs, 
specific schemes, and funding sources 
for expansion and sustaining of services 
to the whole of Kampala, in particular the 
poor and underserved settlements, is 
required. This would catalyze the NWSC, 
GoU, customers and development 
partners and would ensure that pro-poor 
initiatives are brought to the forefront at 
the corporate level and are large scale. 
ii. Pro-poor targets should be set at 
company, branch, and individual staff 
contract level: Although the NWSC’s 
objectives include expanding services 
in unserved areas, these are not clear 
targets, nor are these mentioned in the 
Internally Delegated Area Management 
Contracts (which the head office has 
set up with each of the towns under the 
NWSC’s jurisdiction) and staff contracts. It 
is considered that specifying clear targets 
for expansion of services in unserved 
areas would incentivize NWSC, Kampala 
City Council (KCC), and the Department 
of Water Development to prepare detailed 
investment plans and strategies, and 
thereafter deliver these. These detailed 
targets would need to be included at 
Business Plan level (see point above).
iii. A New Connection Fund: Revenues raised 
through the 11 percent surcharge in the 
water tariff should be sequestered into 
a properly ring-fenced New Connection 
Fund, to improve the effectiveness and 
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efficiency of these operations, and give 
the NWSC’s management a clear view 
on what rate of new connections can 
realistically be achieved. This should be 
supported by a clear view of the water 
supply investment needs—to be included 
in the Business Plan above. Use of the 
Fund could be audited by the GoU and 
development partners. 
iv. Improve marketing and availability of 
prepaid tokens (and customer training 
on how to use them). Alternatively, new 
payment arrangements (for example, 
use of cell phones) can gradually be 
introduced.
II. Recommendations that the NWSC can 
implement with the support and/or approval of 
the GoU:
i. Legal constraints faced in getting new 
connections should be eased: For a 
new connection the NWSC insists on 
production of a land title document, a 
lease document or permission of the 
landowner or lease holder. In the present 
land tenure system many people don’t 
have such land documents and getting a 
water connection is thus not possible for 
them. Documents such as voters lists, 
municipal identification, community group 
guarantees, ration card, and so on, have 
been tried in other countries. Such an 
approach would potentially lead to more 
rapid expansion into unserved areas. 
ii. Size (and scope) of the cross-subsidy 
between different categories of customers 
should be rationalized to maximize total 
revenues: Poor households are indeed 
benefiting from a differentiated flat tariff 
structure. However, the level of subsidy 
appears to be relatively low given that 
domestic, industrial, and institutional 
consumers are only charged twice the rate 
charged at PWPs.  
iii. Effectiveness (and benefit) of the cross-
subsidy should be improved: Poor 
households are not purchasing enough 
water from the NWSC and are therefore 
not benefiting as much as they should be 
from the cross-subsidy. In fact, average 
consumption has reduced from 1.3 
m3/day to 0.6 m3/day for all customer 
categories, due to a combination of water 
supply capacity restrictions (although 
continuity of service is officially reported 
to be at 24x7) and the use of alternative 
sources of water. It is noted that water 
supply tariffs are more affordable to poor 
households when water resale does not 
take place. 
iv. Tariff structure to be improved: Whilst 
the benefits of the differential flat tariff 
structure are recognized, the flat 
tariff for domestic customers is not 
conducive to water saving. Therefore, 
it is recommended that an increasing 
block tariff be set for (nonpoor) domestic 
customers. In addition, it is considered 
that the automatic tariff increase should be 
waived for public standposts. Any revenue 
shortfall could thus be funded via the 
increasing block tariff. 
v. Water tariffs in slums (at PWPs) to be 
equalized (normalized): The differentiated 
tariff rates for water for PWPs/kiosks 
(UGX867/m³) and Presidential Pledge 
taps (UGX784/m³) should eventually be 
standardized.
III. Recommendations that are outside the 
NWSC’s control or influence:
i. Barriers to access caused by the existing 
land tenure system should be addressed 
by the KCC: The Mailo/private land tenure 
system remains a barrier of access to 
these services in poor settlements. As 
owners cannot be forced to provide basic 
urban infrastructure services (including 
water, sanitation, roads, and so on) this 
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limits the utilities’ ability to expand the 
network into unserved areas. While special 
rights can be obtained from relevant 
public authorities, including the KCC and 
the Ministry of Lands, this is not a simple 
process.
ii. Options for managing unsafe, alternative 
sources of water in Kampala’s poor 
settlements should be decided. The 
availability of alternative, unsafe sources 
of water in poor settlements (which 
provide up to 50 percent of all water 
demand in the poor settlements) limits the 
NWSC’s ability to expand consumption. 
Average individual consumption in 
these settlements is less than 20 liters 
per capita per day. In addition, many of 
these alternative sources of water are 
unprotected and therefore unsafe. Thus, 
it is important that the GoU and KCC 
adopt a clear policy for closing and/
or rehabilitating all of these sources. 
This needs to be complemented with a 
detailed analysis of remediation works and 
management options.
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1 
Introduction1
Do pro-poor policies increase water coverage? An analysis 
of service delivery in Kampala’s informal settlements2
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Country and Economic Data
Uganda is one of the poorest countries in Africa with 
a gross national income (GNI) per capita in 2010 of 
US$500 compared with the sub-Saharan regional 
average of $1,170. Uganda’s population growth of over 
3 percent per year, one of the highest in the world, puts 
a considerable strain on public sector service delivery, 
not just for water and sanitation but also in other areas 
such as health, education, and transport. 
Despite being one of the poorest countries in 
the world Uganda has, since the late 1990s, 
developed a coherent poverty reduction 
strategy which focuses on strong governance, 
economic growth, human development, 
and participation of all individuals in the 
development process. Only 12 percent of its 
population lives in urban areas. A selection of 
development indicators for Uganda (2010) are 
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1:  Development Indicators for Uganda (2009 and 2010)
Country overview
Population, total (millions) 33.42
Population growth (annual %) 3.2
Surface area (sq. km) (thousands) 241.0
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population) 24.5
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (billions) 16.55
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 500
GNI, PPP (current international $) (billions) 41.49
People
Income share held by lowest 20% (2009) 5.8
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) in 2009 53
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) in 2009 6.2
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19) in 2009 141
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 99
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%) in 2009 99
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) in 2009 6.5
Economy
GDP (current US$) (billions) 17.01
GDP growth (annual %) 5.2
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 9.1
Global links
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and income) in 2009 2.0
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, received (current US$) (millions) 778
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) (millions) 789
Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$) (millions) 1,786
Source: www.worldbank.org/data/wdi 
31.1.2 Water Resources
As a whole, Uganda has more than enough 
freshwater. Estimates indicate 66 km³ of 
renewable water resources per year, which 
correspond to approximately 1,974 m³ per 
person per year. However, the distribution of the 
resource is uneven both in spatial and temporal 
terms. Furthermore, freshwater is increasingly 
exploited through population growth, 
urbanization, agriculture, and industrialization.
The rivers, lakes, and wetlands cover about 
18 percent of Uganda’s total surface, including 
Lake Victoria, Africa’s largest freshwater lake 
and one of the major sources of the Nile River, 
the longest river of the world. Almost the 
entire country lies within the Nile basin. Rainfall 
contributes most to the country’s surface 
and groundwater. The average annual rainfall 
ranges from 900 mm in the semi-arid areas 
of Kotido to 2,000 mm on the Sese Islands 
in Lake Victoria. Although there is a lack of 
information on the sustainability of groundwater 
recharge, it is considered that groundwater 
recharge in Ugandan towns meets the current 
abstraction volumes. In addition, although the 
water level in Lake Victoria has receded by 
3 percent of its volume between 2003 and 
2006 (due to a combination of a decline in 
rainfall and overexploitation), it is considered to 
provide enough raw water, despite additional 
investments required to extend raw water 
intakes for Kampala, Entebbe, and Jinja (and 
other large cities located around the lake, for 
example, Kisumu in Kenya, and so on). 
1.1.3 Water Supply and Sanitation
The Ugandan water supply and sanitation 
(WSS) sector has made spectacular progress 
in urban areas since the mid-1990s, with 
substantial increases in coverage as well as 
in operational and commercial performance.4 
Sector reforms in the period 1998–2003 included 
the commercialization and modernization of 
the NWSC operating in cities and larger towns, 
as well as decentralization and private sector 
participation in small towns.5 These reforms have 
significantly improved the performance of the 
urban water sector, and thus attracted significant 
international attention. 
However, 40 percent of the population still had 
no access to an improved water source and 57 
percent had no improved sanitation in 2004.6 
Low access to urban sanitation and wastewater 
treatment, compared to the progress achieved 
on urban water supply, remains a key area of 
concern for the sector. 
The water and sanitation sector has been 
recognized as a key area under the 2004 Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), by the then 
Uganda’s main strategy paper to fight poverty.7 
A comprehensive expenditure framework was 
introduced to coordinate financial support by 
external donors, the national government, 
and NGOs.8 The PEAP estimated that from 
2001 to 2015, about US$1.4 billion, or US$92 
million per year, are needed to increase water 
supply coverage up to 95 percent.9 Since 2010 
the PEAP has been replaced by the National 
Development Plan (NDP).
Whilst much has been achieved, significant 
investments are required to maintain and replace 
existing infrastructure, in particular in small-town 
systems and rural areas. Anticipated public funds 
are inadequate to deal with these dual demands 
of expansion and replacement. The considerable 
finance gap that exists for water and sanitation 
means that the positive gains of the past may 
plateau.10
4  Mugisha, Silver, and Sanford V. Berg. November 2006. Struggling State-Owned Enterprises: NWSC’s Turnaround in Uganda. 
5  UN-Water, World Water Assessment Programme. 2006. National Water Development Report: Uganda. Prepared for 2nd UN World Water Development Report, 
“Water, a shared responsibility”.
6  MDG target for urban water supply coverage in Uganda: 100 percent by 2015.
7  Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2004/5–2007/8).
8  Ministry of Water and Environment (Uganda). September 2006. Water and Sanitation Sector Performance Report 2006.
9  Rural areas: US$956 million; urban areas: large towns (US$281 million) and small towns (US$136 million). Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development. Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2004/5–2007/8).
10  WSP et al. 2010. Water Supply and Sanitation in Uganda: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond. An AMCOW Country Status Overview.
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1.1.4 Water Supply Services to  
Poor Households 
In this climate of urban water supply sector 
performance improvement, serving the poor 
has received increased attention not only at the 
political level but also at the utility level. This has 
meant that Uganda’s urban water sector has 
been able to attract increased financial support 
from development partners. 
The NWSC proposed and implemented a 
strategy in 2004 for increasing coverage in 
unserved areas (including poor and nonpoor 
urban areas in the country), called the Affordable 
Connections Policy. The policy stipulates that 
the NWSC will connect all customers (including 
domestic and nondomestic) for free if these are 
located within 50 meters of the NWSC’s water 
mains at the time of application, and will share 
the cost of connection above 50 meters with 
these customers. However, domestic customers 
are expected to pay 50,000 as a connection fee 
(about $20 in 2004). In addition to this strategy, 
the NWSC has implemented a number of options 
for serving poor households that could not be 
connected to the water mains. These include a 
range of community kiosks and water points. 
It is widely considered that this strategy has 
had a significant impact on urban water supply 
coverage and financial sustainability of the 
NWSC, and that the lessons that can be learned 
from the progress of the urban water sector and 
the improvement in services to all customers, 
including poor households, in Uganda, can 
be of real value to sector practitioners and 
development partners worldwide. 
1.2 Study Objectives
The aim of this study is to assess the impact of 
the pro-poor policies introduced by the NWSC 
between 2004 and 2010, by analyzing the 
effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of these 
policies and strategies implemented by the GoU 
and NWSC to increase coverage of urban water 
supply services in poor settlements. The study 
focuses exclusively on the area of Kampala 
city, the capital of Uganda, as this constitutes 
the largest service area of the NWSC—with 
approximately 60 percent of its connections 
and 64 percent of its revenues. The objective 
is to undertake a detailed assessment of the 
workings and implementation of the policy and 
strategy, to identify key lessons that can be 
learned from these approaches, and to provide 
concrete recommendations on how these might 
be improved. 
In addition, the study seeks to address the 
following:
•	 Analyze	the	institutional	arrangement	
for delivery of water to the poor areas 
and assess its impact on different 
stakeholders. In particular, identify the 
potential barriers to access that prevent 
poor households from obtaining safe and 
cost-effective water supply services.
•	 Put	the	reform	challenges	in	perspective	
by reviewing lessons learned.
•	 Analyze	the	effect	of	the	program	on	the	
whole population and particularly the 
poor, and determine whether the policy 
has produced the intended benefits and if 
resources have been spent effectively and 
efficiently. 
•	 Make	recommendations	regarding	
policies, strategies, and design in the 
distribution and management of water 
supply in informal settlements and low 
income areas. 
1.3 Methodology Used and 
Data Collected
The assessment of the impact of the pro-poor 
policies on the poor in Kampala is based on 
an analysis of the effectiveness, the efficiency, 
and the equity of these policies since 2004. The 
5Box 1: Assessing efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of service provision to the poor
Impact assessment criterion
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Equity 
Description
•	 Primarily	related	to	assessing	the	number	of	new	connections	
made in poor settlements versus the intended number of 
connections. 
•	 Indicators:	increased	coverage.
•	 Primarily	related	to	assessing	whether	the	approach	and	the	
service delivery mechanisms chosen to increase coverage were 
the right ones. The approach taken is to determine whether the 
blanket approach to targeting the poor achieved the intended 
increase in connections from poor households. 
•	 Indicators:	increased	coverage,	NRW,	time	saved.
•	 Primarily	related	to	assessing	whether	the	poor	are	getting	a	
similar quality of services than the nonpoor. 
•	 Indicators:	increased	quantity	of	water	available	to	poor	
households, affordability.
degree to which each of the indicators above 
contributes to assessing efficiency, effectiveness, 
and equity is summarized in Box 1.
Specifically, the study assessed the following:
i. Whether access to water supply services 
had increased in poor settlements. This 
was calculated by determining the total 
number of new connections that were 
made in poor settlements, compared 
with the total number of new connections 
made throughout Kampala.
ii. Whether the NWSC had increased the 
quantity of water sold to poor households. 
This is expressed as average unit 
consumption at yard taps, PWPs, and 
prepaid PWPs.
iii. If increasing coverage had led to a 
reduction in the waiting time that poor 
households spend in obtaining/fetching 
water. This is expressed as distance to 
supply and collection time. Estimations of 
this were secured from survey data from the 
Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS). 
iv. Whether the cost of connection and the 
water tariff constituted barriers to access 
for poor households. This was done by 
measuring the cost of connections and 
the tariff as a percentage of the average 
household income in poor areas, also using 
data from UBOS. 
v. Whether the level of nonrevenue water had 
reduced following the increased number 
of customers connected to the network 
in Kampala. The NWSC’s adoption of 
customer service lines was also examined 
as a means of measuring efficiency. Focus 
group discussions (FGDs) were undertaken 
with customers and local stakeholders to 
assess customer satisfaction both with 
the levels of service provided and with 
the processes involved in providing these 
services. 
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1.4 Data Collected
The following data is collected and analyzed: 
•	 Primary	data	from	NWSC	on	17,000	
domestic customers in areas of Kampala 
that are considered to be poor (principally 
consumption and billing data). This was 
obtained from the Billing and Commercial 
division of NWSC with support from the 
Urban Pro-Poor Branch.
•	 Secondary	data,	that	is	reports	from	the	
UBOS, Department of Water Development 
(DWD), KCC, NWSC and the recent 
GPOBA funded project in Kampala. 
This included poverty data as well as 
financial and economic cost and sector 
performance data from NWSC Annual 
Reports. 
•	 Data	obtained	from	the	NWSC’s	GIS	
department to identify the location of the 
water mains and low income settlements.
•	 Qualitative	data	obtained	from	focused	
interviews with customer representatives, 
NWSC senior management, DWD staff 
and local NGOs (including Community 
Development Initiatives or CIDI, and 
Concern Worldwide). A total of 18 FGDs 
were undertaken in 17 parishes and 76 
key informants were interviewed. A variety 
of stakeholders and consumers were 
interviewed, including domestic and PWP 
users, male and female users, protected 
and unprotected spring users, as well as 
water resellers and vendors, community 
water organizers, community leaders, 
local water business entrepreneurs, and 
politicians. 
1.5 Structure of the Report
The report is divided into the following six 
Chapters:
•	 Chapter	1	(this	chapter)	is	the	introduction	of	
the report and presents the objectives and 
methods used.
•	 Chapter	2	presents	an	overview	of	the	
water sector in Kampala, including the legal, 
institutional, and regulatory framework, a 
definition of poverty in Kampala and what 
this means for poor households. Chapter 
2 also provides the baseline situation (as at 
2003/04) against which the assessment of 
the impact of the Affordable Connections 
Policy is made.
•	 Chapter	3	describes	the	urban	water	sector	
policy and the strategy developed by the 
NWSC to expand services and improve 
financial performance. This Chapter also 
presents the policy components and 
delivery mechanisms implemented to serve 
domestic households in Kampala, including 
the creation of a dedicated pro-poor unit, 
the pilot testing of geographical targeting 
of poor households via an output-based 
subsidy from GPOBA, and prepaid PWPs.
•	 Chapter	4	analyzes	in	detail	the	impact	
of NWSC policies and water supply 
delivery mechanisms on services to poor 
households in Kampala. The assessment 
considers coverage, consumption, distance 
to and waiting time at water sources, 
affordability of new water services, and 
impact on NRW. Chapter 4 includes 
specific recommendations for improving the 
effectiveness, efficiency and equity of the 
social connection policy. These can be used 
by other utilities in Africa who are planning 
to implement a social connection policy.
•	 Chapter	5	contains	the	conclusions	of	this	
study.
•	 Chapter	6	contains	recommendations	for	
further analysis which could be undertaken 
by the NWSC, GoU, and/or the World Bank.
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2.1 Legal, Institutional, and 
Regulatory Framework
The urban water supply sector in Uganda 
is dominated by the Ministry of Water and 
Environment (MoWE), which is responsible for 
setting policy and overall sector direction, and the 
NWSC, which is a government-owned parastatal 
responsible for service provision in all urban areas 
of Uganda. 
The reforms in the water and sanitation subsector 
were carried out between 1998 and 2005 
with the objective of ensuring that services are 
provided and managed with increased attention 
to performance and cost effectiveness, to 
decrease the government burden (due to low 
cost recovery) while maintaining the government’s 
commitment to, and investments in, equitable 
and sustainable provision of services in the 
country. 
The underlying policy reforms framework 
for the WSS sector includes a shift to 
community demand for services; decentralized 
implementation and management of services; 
government facilitation; regulation and quality 
assurance; and delivery of goods and services by 
the private sector.
For the urban subsector, the reforms emphasized 
the need for separation of asset ownership 
and operations; commercialization of service 
delivery; establishment of an effective regulatory 
framework; and engagement of the most 
appropriate form of private sector participation.
This Section provides an overview of the legal, 
institutional, and regulatory frameworks which 
led to and underpinned the water sector reform 
process in Uganda.
2.1.1 Legal Framework
The legal documents most relevant to the urban 
water sector include:
(i) The National Water Policy (1999):
The objectives of the National Water Policy of 
Uganda are:
•	 To	manage	and	develop	the	water	
resources of Uganda in an integrated and 
sustainable manner, so as to secure and 
provide water of adequate quantity and 
quality for all social and economic needs 
of the present and future generations with 
the full participation of all stakeholders.
•	 To	provide	safe	water	and	hygienic	
sanitation facilities within easy reach 
based on management responsibility and 
ownership by the users to 75 percent 
of the population in rural areas and 100 
percent of the urban population by 2015, 
and to ensure that 80 percent–90 percent 
of these facilities are effectively used and 
remain functional.
(ii) The National Water and Sewerage Corporation 
Act (2000), which sets out the roles and 
responsibilities of the NWSC and describes 
the institutional framework within which it 
operates, including the substantial autonomy 
which the utility benefits from. 
2.1.2 Institutional Framework
The MoWE has three directorates: 
•	 The	Directorate	of	Water	Development	
(DWD); 
•	 The	Directorate	of	Water	Resources	
Management (DWRM); and 
•	 The	Directorate	of	Environment	Affairs	
(DEA). 
The DWD is responsible for providing 
overall technical oversight for the planning, 
implementation, and supervision of the delivery 
of urban and rural water and sanitation services 
across the country. However, the NWSC is 
responsible for water supply service provision in 
9the 23 large urban centers across the country, 
including Kampala, Entebbe, and Jinja. 
The DWD has also established 95 performance-
based contracts with Water Authorities in small 
towns that are outside the NWSC’s control. 
As such, the DWD’s structure includes a 
Performance Contract Review Committee. 
2.1.3 Regulatory Framework
There is no independent regulator for the urban 
water supply sector in Uganda. Instead, the 
DWD monitors the quality of service provided 
by the NWSC through specific targets and key 
performance indicators (KPIs) such as coverage, 
financial and operating efficiency, unaccounted 
for water, and customer service indicators. 
Since 2009, regulation of water services is carried 
by out the Regulatory Unit of Urban Water Supply 
Department within the DWD. This department 
was set up after extensive consultations 
among key stakeholders. The previous mode 
of regulation was by contracts (as there was no 
regulator). The functions of the Regulation Unit 
include the following:
•	 Setting	standards	for	services	provided	to	
consumers, including targets in relation to 
asset management, technical inputs and 
operational performance, and promotion 
of pro-poor service delivery,
•	 Monitoring	operational	performance	of	
service providers (including NWSC) against 
set targets, and ensuring compliance with 
contractual obligations among the parties 
to the performance and management 
contracts, imposing penalties or remedies 
for substandard performance, and 
creation of comparative competition in the 
market,
•	 Reviewing	requests	and	proposals	for	new	
tariffs, adjustment of existing tariffs for 
approval, and ensuring that only approved 
tariffs are applied, 
•	 Keeping	stakeholders	informed	about	
service performance and activities of the 
service providers through information 
dissemination.
Other relevant regulatory functions such as 
abstraction licensing, water quality surveillance, 
and permits for wastewater discharge are held 
by other departments within the DWD. The 
independence of the regulation unit can be 
questioned; the sector is, however, planning for 
gradually establishing an independent regulator.
The structure of the institutional and regulatory 
framework is illustrated in Figure 1. 
2.2 NWSC Internal Reforms
The GoU initiated the reorganization of NWSC in 
2000 by amending the NWSC Statute and Act. 
This provided substantial operational autonomy 
to the NWSC to operate services on a financially 
and commercially viable basis. The Corporation’s 
debt service obligations ($100 million prior to 
2000) were temporarily suspended by the GoU 
on the condition that the NWSC makes significant 
financial and operational improvements. The 
government also gave the NWSC the political 
mandate to implement pro-poor reforms.
2.2.1 Key Elements of the Internal Reforms
The key elements of the turn-around of the 
NWSC, designed to create an efficient and 
financially sound organization, were:
i. Clear goals set by the government, 
including more autonomy (less 
interference) and support provided to 
the NWSC including additional CAPEX, 
budget, tariffs, internal policies, and 
strategies.
ii. Strong leadership by NWSC management 
with the long term vision of being one of 
the leading water utilities in the world.
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Figure 1: Institutional and regulatory framework for urban water supply 
services in Uganda
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with MoWE)
Performance contracts with 
local private operators
74 Town Councils and 9 Town 
Boards have management 
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iii. Focusing on strengthening the financial 
credentials of the Corporation, including 
cutting costs, reducing operational 
inefficiencies, improving billing and 
revenue collection through improvement of 
customer metering and reduction of illegal 
connections, and increasing the number of 
registered connections/customers.
iv. Creation of a professional incentive-based 
structure (at organization, business, 
and staff levels) and associated internal 
monitoring and evaluation systems.
v. Benchmarking performance with 
international best practice.
vi. Creation of a customer-oriented culture, 
with the NWSC’s current motto: “The 
customer is the reason we exist”.
vii. Improved donor coordination through 
sectorwide approaches to planning, 
and use of donors for expanding the 
knowledge base of the corporation.
It is clear from the above that in 2000 there was 
no deliberate focus on expanding services to 
the poor. Instead, the focus was on improving 
commercial performance and financial autonomy, 
and on reducing operational inefficiencies. 
2.2.2 Focus on Performance and 
Performance Benchmarking
The sector reform process included significant 
changes within the NWSC. To increase 
accountability and performance, the Corporation 
created and set up Internally Delegated Area 
Management Contracts (IDAMC) between 
the head office and each of the urban areas 
in its area of service. These internal branches 
of the NWSC are all financially independent, 
with managers appointed through individual 
staff performance contracts, which mimic the 
typical performance clauses (including bonuses 
and penalties) of private sector participation 
contracts. The head office is, thus, overseeing 
the performance of 23 IDAMCs, including that of 
Kampala which is the largest. 
The Kampala IDAMC is itself subdivided into 
nine water supply and sewerage branches. The 
managers of each of those branches are also 
contracted through individual staff performance 
contracts. Typical targets (at branch and at 
business level) include:
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•	 Increase	sales—including	billing	and	
revenue collection.
•	 Reduce	unaccounted	for	water.
•	 Increase	the	number	of	customers—and	
therefore sales.
•	 Increase	productivity—and	cut	costs.
•	 Increase	and	ensure	customer	satisfaction.
Expansion of services to poor areas is not 
considered as a contractual KPI—either at 
business level or at branch level, although the 
construction of water points is one of the many 
activities undertaken by each of the branch 
engineers/operators. 
2.2.3 Autonomy for Setting Tariffs
The NWSC’s autonomy to set its own tariffs (to 
be reviewed and approved by the MoWE) came 
in 2004, when the Corporation was able to 
implement a differentiated and flat tariff structure. 
This means that there is a specific flat rate tariff 
for each of the NWSC’s customer categories 
across all water supply areas: industrial and 
commercial, government and institutional, 
and domestic. An additional flat rate tariff was 
developed for PWPs. The MoWE considers that 
the flat tariff structure (per customer category) 
ensures equity in supply and pricing.11
Although the tariff structures are reviewed and 
approved by the DWD and MoWE, the tariff 
levels have, since 2004, been subjected to 
automatic annual indexation against the domestic 
Consumer Price Index (inflation), exchange rate, 
foreign price index, and electricity tariffs. This 
was designed to protect the company’s financial 
equilibrium and to maintain real value for the tariff. 
These automatic adjustments help ensure that 
the NWSC is able to recover all its operating and 
maintenance costs and to make provision for 
depreciation.12
To this date, the NWSC is one of the only utilities 
in the African region that has adopted automatic 
(annual) tariff adjustments. However, tariffs do 
not yet allow the NWSC to service old debts or 
cover the costs of commercial borrowing. To 
enable loan servicing the tariff would have to be 
increased by about 60 percent (according to 
PEAP, 2004). 
2.3 Definition and Incidence of Poverty 
in Kampala
2.3.1 Definition of Poverty
Poverty in Uganda is measured in absolute terms 
by measuring the level of income against the 
expenditure needed to secure basic food and 
nonfood items. This is determined through a 
national household survey. The trends in poverty 
show a decline in poverty at the national level 
from 55.7 percent in 1992 to 31.1 percent in 
2005–06 (Uganda National Household Survey, 
UNHS, 2005). In urban areas, the level of poverty 
came down to 13.7 percent in 2005–06. In the 
Central Urban region in which Kampala city falls, 
the number of poor households is estimated to 
be 127,755. This number is growing.
To appreciate the extent of poverty in its supply 
areas (in particular Kampala), and to develop 
concrete plans to provide these households with 
sustainable services, the NWSC has developed 
its own definition of poverty. This is based on four 
parameters:
•	 Poor	households	have	monthly	incomes	
of less than UGX80,000 ($48), which is 
about one-third of the individual house 
connection fee (at $125) and 14 percent 
of the average cost of connection ($350).
•	 Poor	households	live	in	clustered	
settlements with a high crowding index of 
up to 14 persons per household (although 
11 MoWE. 2011. Uganda Water and Environment Sector Performance Report 2011.
12 World Bank. 2010. Uganda Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs 5, 6, and 7): Implementation Completion and Results Report.
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the average household size is reported by 
Uganda Bureau of Statistics as six).
•	 Poor	households	have	very	low	water	
consumption of 0–20 liters per capita per 
day (lcpd) which equates to 3.6 m3/month 
for a household of six), as they use this 
water mainly for drinking and cooking.
•	 Poor	households	do	not	have	their	own	
house connection and mainly use PWPs 
(including kiosks). 
2.3.2 Incidence of Poverty in Kampala
The incidence of poverty in Uganda in general, and 
Kampala in particular, is difficult to assess because 
the last population Census was undertaken in 
2002 (a new population Census will be undertaken 
in 2012). However, a number of studies have 
been carried out since the last one, which provide 
some guidance on the relative percentage of poor 
households in urban areas and in Kampala. 
Kampala has grown very rapidly in the last two 
decades. It has experienced a rapid population 
growth of nearly 4 percent per annum from 
774,241 in 1991 to 1,189,142 in 2002 (last 
Census). This is summarized in Table 2. The 
population forecast for 2010 uses a growth rate of 
about 4 percent per annum.
Table 2: Population growth in Kampala (1980 to 2010)
Source: UBOS Census 2002 data (selected).
 1980 1991 2002 2010 (projection)
Kampala population 458,503 774,241 1,189,142 1,597,800
National urban population 938,503 1,889,622 2,921,981 3,992,180
National urban growth rate p.a.  4.88% 3.98% 3.98%
Kampala as % of national urban Population 48.85% 40.97% 40.69% 40.02%
The main reasons for this high rate of population 
growth are increased demand for employment, 
land for housing, as well as social services 
and infrastructure that have stimulated spatial 
urban development and industrialization and, 
as a consequence, a high rate of rural to urban 
migration. Additional demographic factors 
include high fertility, the decline in mortality, 
internal migration, and immigration. New informal 
settlements have emerged while others are 
expanding, thereby increasing both the number 
and the size of unserved (informal) areas. 
Civil infrastructure has not kept pace with 
this explosion of population. This means that 
the living environment of the urban poor can 
be characterized as follows: poor sanitation, 
inadequate housing and urban infrastructure, 
poorly managed solid and human waste, and 
increased environmental pollution. 
The challenge with identifying the number and 
size of Kampala’s informal settlements is their 
fast and ever-changing nature. In 2002, the 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme 
(UN-Habitat) estimated that 44 percent of the 
population of Kampala lived in slums.13 This 
corresponds well with the 2002 Census which 
stated that approximately 120,000 households in 
Kampala were poor. These informal settlements 
cover up to 25 percent of the total area of the 
city. Sixty-five percent of the city’s population has 
13 UN-Habitat. 2002. Addressing the urban water challenges in Kampala.
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access to clean and safe piped water, the rest 
gets water from unhygienic and highly polluted/
contaminated sources. 
Several sources converge on the estimation that 
more than half the population of Kampala lives 
in slums. A study undertaken by the Ministry of 
Lands, Housing and Urban areas (MoLHU) in 
2008, for example, estimated that 64 percent 
of the population of Kampala lived in slums (an 
increase of 20 percent over six years), adding 
to approximately 170,000 households. The 
MoLHU’s findings are echoed by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) (2010) which states that 60 
percent of the population of Kampala lived in 
slums and lacked access to utilities and amenities. 
Likewise, UN-Habitat (2007) states that over 60 
percent of the population of Kampala lives in 
slums.14
The NWSC has developed a map of the city 
of Kampala divided into 500m by 500m block 
maps—117 of these block maps have been 
identified (and are considered) as being poor. The 
map showing the extent of the distribution network 
and the location of known poor settlements in 
Kampala is included in the Appendixes. 
2.4 Land Tenure and Its Impact on 
Services to the Poor
The region in which Kampala is located has a 
complex land tenure system. One system is 
‘mailo.’ The basic unit of the mailo system is a 
square mile, hence the derivation of mailo, which 
is also equivalent to 640 acres. The term is used 
in Uganda to describe a land tenure system that 
came into effect when the Kingdom of Buganda 
signed an agreement with the British-administered 
Uganda Protectorate there in 1900. Other systems 
are freehold, leasehold and customary tenure. 
The Kingdom of Buganda owns 52 percent of the 
land in Kampala. The system is described as a 
14 See: “Situation Analysis of Informal Settlements in Kampala - Cities without Slums Sub-regional Programme for Eastern and Southern Africa” (Series title) (this 
is a report prepared in partnership with Kampala City Council). The report focuses in particular on two parishes: Kivulu (Kagugube) and Kinawataka (Mbuyu 1).
15 UN-Habitat. 2007. See Footnote 14.
16 Kampala Urban Sanitation Project (2006).
significant challenge for the orderly development 
not only of slums but of Kampala City in 
general.15
The main issue with the land ownership system 
is that approximately 50 percent of Kampala16 is 
held under a freehold (or similar, Mailo) system 
in which KCC and the central government are 
unable to plan, control, and enforce orderly 
urban development. Freehold (and Mailo) 
landowners (including absentee landlords and 
secondary, illegal, owners) cannot be forced to 
provide infrastructure services to the informal 
residents that have settled on this land. As such, 
development in these areas is haphazard and 
continues to be informal. 
This has huge impact on the NWSC’s ability 
and incentive to provide sustainable water 
supply and sanitation services in Kampala, as 
the Corporation expects to see documentary 
proof of land ownership, or a sale agreement. 
Thus, squatters are not recognized as potential 
customers. The only way forward for the utility 
is to provide PWPs on private land (where the 
landlord often becomes the PWP/kiosk operator) 
or to provide services on land which is not 
under Mailo/freehold ownership, such as that 
which is likely to be on the outskirts of the poor 
settlements. Rigid water supply connection 
requirements based on formal land tenure are 
preventing poor households from accessing 
improved levels of service.
2.5 2002 Baseline of Urban Poor 
Coverage Areas in Kampala 
2.5.1 Background of Water Supply Services 
in Kampala’s Poor Areas
The terrain of Kampala is hilly and has many 
natural springs. The poor have settled in the 
low lying swampy areas, which were less 
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attractive and therefore cheaper than the areas 
located higher up the hills. A study of 160 
springs in Kampala by Chemiphar (2006) in 35 
urban poor parishes indicated that 80 percent 
of the inhabitants in these urban poor parishes 
obtained domestic water from springs (protected 
or unprotected); that 79 (49 percent) of these 
sources were totally unfit for drinking, another 79 
(49 percent) could be used for drinking once the 
water was boiled, and that only two sources (1 
percent) were actually safe to drink (but were not 
chlorinated). 
The study also confirmed that other sources 
of supply were available (not counted in the 
Chemiphar study), including hand dug wells 
and protected springs made by charitable 
individuals and/or organizations, and a limited 
number of PWPs. As a consequence, and further 
exacerbated by low competition (and perhaps 
collusion), the cost of piped water to poor 
households was expensive due to significant 
reselling (and little real competition). The survey 
also showed limited access to water points, 
unaffordable prices charged at the existing water 
points, and the perception from poor households 
that the alternative sources could provide drinking 
water. 
Box 2: Typology of water supply connections in Kampala
•	 House connection: Individual metered house connection to the water supply network where the 
point of supply is inside the house, and therefore associated with internal plumbing, showers, 
taps, sinks, storage tanks, and so on. A house connection is always associated with some kind of 
drainage system (network, pit, and so on). 
•	 Yard tap: Similar to the individual house connection except that the point of supply is in the yard 
and is usually shared between a small number of households (usually two to three). A yard tap is not 
usually associated with internal plumbing or a drainage system.
•	 Public water point: Metered connection which is typically a battery of taps fed by one connection 
and recognized as such by the NWSC. Public water points are usually managed directly by the 
NWSC or someone appointed by it (for example, a community group, an individual, and so on).
•	 Kiosk: Typically, a battery of taps developed by a private individual (operator or community-based 
organization) to sell water to the public. Kiosk operators usually charge a mark up on the normal 
tariff. A kiosk implies a formal structure and attracts the preferential public water point/kiosk tariff.
Field visits also found that many of the sources 
had not been labeled as unfit for human 
consumption, as was the accepted practice by 
KCC staff. In addition, many of the 307 PWPs 
and 59 protected springs built by the KCC with 
support from the French Development Agency 
(AFD) between 2002 and 2006 (following cholera 
outbreaks in the late 1990s) had become 
dysfunctional due to poor operation and 
maintenance (O&M). The main reason was found 
to be the backlog of huge arrears accumulating 
from nonpayment of PWP/kiosk operators to the 
NWSC. 
This meant that the NWSC had to disconnect 
those nonpaying PWPs and kiosks (in total 
between 5 percent and 10 percent of these 
were disconnected). In addition, field surveys 
undertaken in 2011 showed that the so-called 
protected springs had been constructed upon—
sometimes with—latrines, rendering these so-
called protected springs unsafe. 
2.5.2 Water Supply Coverage
The typology of water supply services provided by 
the NWSC to domestic customers is described in 
Box 2.
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According to the 2002 Census, 98 percent 
of households in Kampala had access to 
safe drinking water sources (tap/piped water, 
borehole, spring water, gravity flow, and rain 
water) while 2 percent used water from unsafe 
sources. Additional data from the National 
Service Delivery Survey (2004) suggest that 
access to improved water sources was also high 
(but not as high), but that there was seasonal 
variation and significant use of alternative sources 
of water. This data are summarized in Table 3. 
Key observations are that:
•	 Only	a	limited	number	of	households	in	
urban areas (NWSC-wide) had individual 
house and/or yard connections (22 
percent). This is consistent with NWSC 
data that show that only 20 percent 
of households in Kampala had house 
connections in 2002 (this includes a house 
connection and/or a yard tap).17
•	 About	35	percent	of	households,	
presumably the poorest, obtain water from 
boreholes, protected springs, and gravity 
schemes (40 percent in the wet season). It 
is considered that as much as 50 percent 
of households used these alternative 
sources.
•	 As	many	households	obtain	water	for	
drinking from safe sources as they do 
water for other uses than drinking from 
unsafe (unimproved) sources. This could 
mean that demand for NWSC water 
is potentially only half of total average 
Table 3: Sources of water in urban areas (National data, NSDS, 2004)
 Dry season  Wet season
Water source (urban only) Water for drinking Other uses Water for drinking Other uses
Piped water in dwelling 9% 9% 9% 9%
Piped water in compound 13% 13% 12% 13%
Piped water outside compound 27% 27% 24% 23%
Borehole, protected spring, gravity flow scheme 39% 33% 33% 26%
Rain water 0% 0% 13% 16%
Unprotected source 8% 11% 6% 8%
Lake, river, stream, pond, dam 3% 6% 2% 5%
Other 1% 1% 1% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
    
Breakdown (improved /unimproved)
Water source (urban only) Water for drinking Other uses Water for drinking Other uses
Improved 88% 82% 91% 86%
Unimproved 12% 18% 9% 14%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
17 The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2004) mentions urban water supply coverage of only 18 percent with house connections and/or yard taps.
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demand—particularly in unserved/poor 
settlements.
•	 A	significant	number	of	households	use	
rainwater for drinking (13 percent) and for 
other uses (16 percent) during the wet 
season.
Table 4 provides some additional insight as it 
shows the distance to the nearest water point for 
households in the same parishes as above (also 
based on the 2002 Census). These are shown in 
Figure 3.
The Census 2002 data (see above) show that 
79 percent of the population in the poor areas 
of Kampala obtained water (drinking water) 
from water points located up to 1 km from their 
homes, and implies that households that do not 
have access to water on their premises are able 
to access this water from another piped source 
such as a PWP/kiosk. 
The 2002 Census also does not comment on 
whether the number of PWPs/kiosks provided 
in these poor settlements was sufficient. There 
Name of parish/division On  % on  Up to % up  1 to % 1 5 km % 5 km 
 premises premises 1 km to 1 km 5 km to 5 km and over and over Total 
Naguru II/Nakawa 2,342 37% 3,906 62% 24 0% - 0% 6,272
Banda/Nakawa 220 7% 3,084 93% 7 0% 1 0% 3,312
Kisenyi II/Central 854 31% 1,943 69% 3 0% - 0% 2,800
Kamwokya II/Central 1,165 26% 3,320 74% 12 0% 9 0% 4,506
Katwe I/Makindye 390 15% 2,150 83% 35 1% - 0% 2,575
Wabigalo/Makindye 730 15% 4,252 85% 20 0% - 0% 5,002
Bwaise III /Kawampe 430 14% 2,544 85% 16 1% 1 0% 2,991
Mulago II/Kawampe 699 17% 3,404 83% 3 0% 1 0% 4,107
Nakulabye II/Rubaga 1,015 17% 4,666 79% 197 3% 8 0% 5,886
Ndeeba/Rubaga 706 14% 4,245 85% 57 1% 1 0% 5,009
Total 8,551 20% 33,514 79% 374 1% 21 0% 42,460
Note: There is no breakdown of distance for less than 1 km
Table 4: Distance to nearest water source (Kampala slums, 2002 Census)
is thus little information available on the level of 
suppressed/unmet demand in poor settlements. 
There are some difficulties with providing water 
supply services to poor households in Kampala. 
These are described in more detail below.
2.5.3 Income and Expenditure Review 
(Affordability and Willingness to Pay)
The 2002 Census, the 2004 NSDS survey 
and household surveys as well as studies by a 
number of consultants have indicated that the 
willingness to pay for improved water services 
was high among poor households. Generally, 
households were ready to pay the official NWSC 
rates for water, but there remained a significant 
proportion of households who cited the cost of 
water (or perhaps the cost of access the water, 
that is, the cost of connection) to be high. These 
households may also have been commenting 
on the high cost of water obtained from water 
vendors (or owners of PWPs) who have applied 
significant mark ups. 
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The weekly expenditures in 2004, for water in 
three large poor parishes Kisenyi I, Kisenyi II, and 
Ndeeba with large informal settlements, were in the 
range of UGX1,000 to 5,000, or 4,000 to 20,000 
per month (Beller Consult, 2006), which represents 
5 percent to 25 percent of average monthly income 
for poor households. This is confirmed by PEAP 
(2004) which mentions that households in the 
bottom 20 percent income quintile (who chose to 
use and pay for NWSC water) devoted as much as 
22 percent of their income to purchase water from 
PWPs/kiosks. 
In addition, 69 percent to 76 percent of the 
households surveyed were ready to pay for 
improved water services. Since this price level was 
already higher than that of NWSC standpost rates 
of supply, it can be assumed that the households 
would welcome domestic connections for clean 
water supply (Sanitation Strategy and Master Plan 
for Kampala, 2004).
The cost of connection in Kampala prior to 
2004 included a connection fee of UGX125,000 
($75). In addition to that, customers were 
expected to pay for the full cost of connection 
(service line) from the NWSC’s water mains to 
their customer meter. This represented a total 
of $275 to $375 which was not affordable to 
poor households and meant that these very 
households were incentivized to overlook the 
quality of materials and workmanship used to 
construct their service lines. In turn, this caused 
significant losses to the NWSC from these 
poorly constructed service lines. 
The NWSC management, therefore, discussed 
and implemented a number of strategies to 
address the low coverage and high levels of 
losses. These strategies are discussed in more 
detail in the following Section. 
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This Chapter presents the different elements of the 
pro-poor policy of the GoU, and describes the pro-
poor strategy that was implemented in 2004 by the 
NWSC. 
The GoU’s first focus on the poor came with the 
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which lead 
to developing and informing the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP) and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Credits (PRSC) and specific amendments 
to policies and government Acts. Thus, the PEAP 
is the cornerstone of all pro-poor interventions in 
the country. 
3.1 GoU’s Poverty Eradication 
Action Plans
In 1997 Uganda was the first country to prepare 
a comprehensive and participatory national 
development strategy, the PEAP. One of the main 
objectives of the GoU, as declared in its successive 
PEAPs, is to improve the equitable distribution 
of water resources in the urban areas, and thus 
to improve coverage and the volume of water 
available to households, in the spirit of “less for all 
rather than all for some”. This Section outlines the 
objectives and pillars of the PEAPs as well as the 
national planning framework that they supported.
The first PEAP outlined a basic change in the 
government’s strategy to deliver basic services 
to the poor by recognizing the multidimensional 
nature of poverty and adopting a multisectoral 
approach for its eradication. Under this plan, 
Uganda is being transformed into a modern 
economy in which people in all sectors can 
participate in economic growth. 
Priority actions for the water sector are identified in 
PEAP (2004) as follows: 
•	 Review	the	water	sector	targets	in	light	of	
the Long Term Expenditure Framework 
(LTEF) projections.
•	 Prioritize	provision	of	water	and	sanitation	
services to the rural population and the 
urban poor.
The GoU also pointed out that the financing of 
urban water was a public responsibility and that 
the investment plan would be difficult to finance 
within the GoU’s existing available budget/
envelope. The PEAP was, therefore, used as 
a key input into the World Bank’s PRSP and 
associated PRSC. The strategy for achieving 
PRSC targets for the urban water sector was 
based on the following components:
•	 Sector-Wide	Approach	(SWAp)	to	
planning.
•	 Autonomous	management	of	service	
provision by professionals.
•	 Emphasis	on	commercialization,	financial	
viability, cost recovery, and operational 
efficiency.
•	 Use	of	the	private	sector	in	construction	
and management of water supply 
schemes.
•	 Ownership	of	assets	vested	in	the	public	
sector.
•	 Independent	regulation.
•	 Sustainability	and	replicability	of	
approaches.
•	 Pro-poor	approaches.	
The overall national framework supported by 
the first PEAP (1997) lead the GoU to develop a 
number of sector specific policies and strategies, 
including the National Water Policy (1999) and 
the Pro-Poor Strategy of the Ministry of Water 
and Environment (2004). These are described in 
more detail here. 
3.2 The Government’s Pro-Poor Water 
Policies and Strategies
Following the preparation and review of PEAPs, 
sector stakeholders managed to find little 
evidence of water supply and sanitation service 
delivery to poor households in urban areas. 
With support from budget support grants and 
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credits from the corresponding PRSCs, the GoU 
developed the National Water Policy (1999) and 
later the Pro-Poor Strategy of the MoWE in 2004. 
3.2.1 National Water Policy Targets and  
MDG Goals
The National Water Policy of 1999 was 
developed to provide further guidance on the 
objectives, targets, and processes envisioned in 
the first PEAP. The National Water Policy also lays 
down the timeline for the water and sanitation 
sector as follows: 
“Sustainable provision of safe water within easy 
reach and hygienic sanitation facilities, based on 
management responsibility and ownership by 
the users to 77 percent of the population in rural 
areas and 100 percent of the urban population 
by the year 2015, with an 80 percent–90 percent 
effective use and functionality of facilities” 
(MoWE, 2004). 
It is noted here that the GoU’s water supply 
coverage target of 100 percent in urban areas 
by 2015 is more ambitious than the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) target of halving the 
proportion of people without sustainable access 
to safe drinking water and improved sanitation by 
2015. 
As per the 2008 National Service Delivery Survey, 
rural water supply coverage was about 67 
percent, and the urban water coverage was 94 
percent, making it a combined national coverage 
of 71.6 percent, thus meeting the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)-assessed 
MDG target of 62 percent, but still falling short of 
the final PEAP/ministry targets.
Although the national target was set at 100 
percent there was no specific policy and strategy 
on how to expand services to unserved (poor) 
settlements, nor were any investment programs 
identified to deliver such services. The MoWE 
carried out an assessment of past policies and 
strategies in 2004, and published an updated 
strategy in 2006. This is described in more detail 
below.
3.2.2 GoU’s Pro-Poor Policy
A review of the pro-poor performance of current 
policies, strategies, and practice by the DWD 
(undertaken in 2004) revealed that, while water 
sector policies were generally committed towards 
improving the social and economic conditions of 
all Ugandans, the policies had a weak orientation 
towards improving actual services to the poor 
and were generally unclear about the role of 
the GoU and implications of these previous 
policies on the poor.18 The DWD’s assessment 
found that flat tariffs charged at PWPs were not 
benefiting the poor because of significant mark-
ups charged by middlemen (for example, kiosk 
operators) and that the intended consumption 
subsidies embedded in the tariff were actually 
benefiting customers who were already 
connected to the network, and not the poor.19
The government’s policy for serving the poor 
(2004) therefore emphasized the following points:
i. To ensure equitable allocation of subsector 
budget. 
ii. To improve overall sector performance.
iii. To enhance access by increasing the 
density of network/points and expanding 
to unserved areas.
iv. To target vulnerable groups such as 
women, people with disabilities and HIV/
AIDS.
v. To improve sanitation and hygiene 
practice.
vi. To monitor the impact of water supply and 
sanitation services on the poor: This led to 
18 DWD/MoWE. 2004. Pro-poor strategy of the water and sanitation sector. The assessment was undertaken in 2004 by the DWD (Finance Thematic Subsector 
Working Group) but the actual policy was written in 2006. The full report is included in the Appendixes. 
19 These were common weaknesses of consumption subsidies in sub-Saharan Africa.
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the monitoring and evaluation process of 
the MoWE’s Sector Performance Report. 
vii. To encourage participation of the poor and 
giving them a voice, through mechanisms 
such as Water User Associations (WUA).
viii. To establish more PWPs in poor 
settlements.
ix. To create a pro-poor tariff structure: Set 
up cross-subsidies between different 
customer categories.
x. To subsidize yard connections serving 
as authorized PWPs: An arrangement 
where the water authority would work with 
existing yard tap owners to use the yard 
taps as designated PWPs, managed by 
the respective owners on behalf of the 
authority. 
xi. To recognize that the poor only benefit 
from the consumption subsidies if they 
are connected to (or have access to) 
the network. This policy is supported by 
specific activities designed to increase 
water supply coverage
xii. To continuously monitor water quality.
Following this new policy, the NWSC developed 
its own pro-poor strategy and pro-poor service 
delivery mechanisms.
3.3 NWSC’s Pro-Poor Policy 
and Instruments 
The NWSC’s specific approach for providing 
services to unserved (poor) settlements was 
developed in 2004 and officially published in 
2006 to follow the MoWE’s Pro-Poor Water and 
Sanitation Sector Policy. 
However, the NWSC’s approach for serving 
poor households is not enshrined in a specific 
pro-poor strategy. Rather, NWSC management 
developed and implemented a number of 
activities that were considered to have significant 
positive impacts on the quality and sustainability 
of services to poor households. The main 
components of the NWSC’s pro-poor strategy 
were:
•	 Component	1:	An	Affordable	Connections	
Policy20 which helps all customers, 
including the poor, to connect to the 
network by subsidizing the cost of the 
connection. The policy is supported by a 
New Connection Fund which is funded 
through an 11 percent surcharge in the 
water tariff.
•	 Component	2:	A	differentiated	flat	tariff	
structure which allows for consumption 
subsidies to be targeted to poor 
households, and a certain level of cross 
subsidy between industrial and commercial 
customers on the one side, and domestic 
customers on the other. 
•	 Component	3:	A	Pro-Poor	Targeting	
Project which the NWSC has been 
implementing since 2008 with GPOBA 
support. This project is providing yard taps, 
PWPs and prepaid PWPs in targeted poor 
settlements of Kampala, and is therefore 
a shift from the Affordable Connections 
Policy which is not specifically targeting the 
poor. 
The NWSC used different delivery mechanisms to 
implement its pro-poor strategy. These include: 
•	 Mechanism	1:	Setting	up	a	dedicated	
pro-poor unit (called the Urban Pro-Poor 
Branch) in Kampala.
•	 Mechanism	2:	Giving	customers	a	choice	
levels of service:
 PWP/kiosks; 
 Presidential Pledge taps; 
 Yard taps; and
 Prepaid connections—only 
implemented in 2008.
20 The policy is actually called “The New Policy of Providing and Maintaining Service Lines to Customers”, but for ease of reference shall be referred to as Affordable 
Connections Policy throughout this report. 
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These components and mechanisms for 
delivering pro-poor services are described in 
more detail below.
3.4 Principal Components of the        
Pro-Poor Policy
3.4.1 Component 1: The Affordable 
Connections Policy
The NWSC’s Affordable Connections Policy was 
adopted on July 1, 2004. The principal objectives 
of the policy were to:
•	 Increase	the	number	of	connections	for	
all customer categories (domestic and 
nondomestic), thereby making water 
accessible to the population, especially the 
urban poor. 
•	 Ensure	standardization	in	the	quality	of	
materials used for connection, and thus 
contribute to reducing technical losses due 
to leaks and bursts within the service lines. 
Previously consumers were responsible for 
paying for their own connection to NWSC 
mains, and therefore had an incentive to 
use cheaper/nonstandard materials which 
led to leakages and loss of water.
Highlights of the policy include:
•	 The	connection	fee	for	a	standard	half-
inch connection was reduced from 
UGX125,000 ($75) to 59,000 ($35). 
Rates were similarly cut across the 
board for other sizes of connections (and 
nondomestic customers).
•	 The	NWSC	should	meet	all	the	costs	of	
connections within a radius of 50 meters 
from the NWSC supply point. Thus 
the NWSC mobilized and provided all 
materials (pipes and fittings) and labor 
(trenching and pipe laying) for construction 
of the service line up to the customers’ 
meter. The NWSC estimated that this 
represented an annual investment of 
UGX4 billion21 ($2 million). 
•	 The	costs	of	constructing	connection	
lengths greater than 50 meters were 
shared between the customer and 
the NWSC. In addition, the cost of 
reconnection (for example, following 
disconnection or illegal connections) 
was reduced to UGX75,000 or $45 
(with the same policy based on length of 
connection).
The NWSC recognized that, to be financially 
sustainable, the connections policy needed to be 
internally funded. Therefore: 
•	 The	Affordable	Connections	Policy	was	
funded via a 10.7 percent tariff surcharge 
applied to domestic, commercial/
industrial, and institutional/government 
customers,22 with most of the subsidy 
coming from commercial and industrial 
customers and government institutions. 
•	 Revenue	from	the	tariff	surcharge	was	
to be ring-fenced in a dedicated New 
Connections Fund and used exclusively 
for new connections in line with the policy. 
The Affordable Connections Policy is derived from 
the following policy documents (NWSC Board 
Paper 571 of 2004):
•	 The	NWSC	Corporate	Plan:	2003–2006	
Strategic Goals, in which it is stated 
that “the NWSC is to create funds for 
maintenance, new connections, and 
network extensions as part of its strategy 
to ensure that investments and new 
connections are implemented on a timely 
basis”.
•	 The	Performance	Contract	with	the	GoU:	
2003–2006, which states that “The NWSC 
will undertake the introduction of a “New 
Connection Fund” mechanism in the tariff 
policy that will help accelerate provision 
21 The breakdown as estimated by the NWSC is shown in the Appendixes.
22 However, large industrial consumers using more than 1,500 m3 per month were not included in the 10.7 percent tariff surcharge (and therefore were not included in 
the cross-subsidy pool).
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of services to the poor and also curb the 
incidence of unaccounted-for water”. 
•	 The	Poverty	Reduction	Support	Credit	
(PRSC IV) targets which provide that within 
the period April 2004 to March 2005, the 
NWSC will develop a water tariff structure 
aimed at encouraging new connections 
through the establishment of a Connection 
Fund. This would also address the access 
of safe water to the poor.
The Affordable Connections Policy developed 
and implemented by the NWSC since 2004 was 
not based on a detailed assessment of needs, 
capital investments, and funding sources by 
water supply zone or area in Kampala per se, 
but rather on the Corporation’s estimate of the 
number of new connections it considered it could 
deliver annually and on its ability to raise enough 
funding for new connections through a tariff 
surcharge.
In addition, the Affordable Connections Policy 
enabled the NWSC to plug a major loophole in 
the institutional and operational framework as 
it agreed to adopt, and therefore operate and 
maintain, all customer service lines between the 
NWSC mains and the customer meter. Previously 
(that is, before the change in ownership and 
management responsibility) the NWSC was not 
responsible for these lines—and neither were the 
customers. That meant that losses from bursts 
and leaks on these lines remained relatively 
uncontrolled and explains the NWSC’s high level 
of unaccounted for water in 2004 (at more than 
40 percent of water produced). 
3.4.2 Component 2: Differentiated and     
Pro-Poor Tariff 
A key element of the NWSC’s pro-poor policy 
was a differentiated tariff structure that allowed 
for different flat rates for different types of 
customers (essentially domestic, institutional/
government, and commercial/industrial). This 
was implemented in 2004. However, the NWSC 
went a step further and also implemented a 
water tariff specific to public water points—as a 
means to subsidize water consumption to poor 
households. 
Thus PWPs/kiosks were given the lowest 
water rates, followed by domestic connections 
and commercial tariffs (which were the most 
expensive). The tariff was designed such that 
large consumers, including domestic customers, 
government/institutions, and commercial/
industrial customers using up to 500 m3/month 
cross subsidize the water supply tariff at PWPs. 
It was considered that industrial consumers 
using more than 1,500 m3/month should not be 
included in the tariff surcharge—as they might 
decide to develop their own sources of water and 
thus no longer use the NWSC’s. 
The water tariff has been indexed on the 
Consumer Price Index and on fuel and energy 
prices also since 2004, so as to protect the 
NWSC’s ability to recover its O&M costs from 
collected revenue.23 The water tariff for 2008–09 
is shown in Table 5. 
With these automatic increases, the NWSC is 
one of the very few African utilities that is able 
to protect its revenue generation from a large 
increase in operational costs, for example, due to 
rising electricity prices. 
Yard taps are considered as domestic 
connections and therefore charged the domestic 
tariff. However, the NWSC analyzes the average 
monthly consumption at the yard taps to 
determine whether these are shared between 
many families and thus used as PWPs. In that 
case, the NWSC automatically informs the 
household under whose name the yard tap is 
registered that they will be charged the PWP 
tariff. Therefore, yard taps that are used by two or 
three households are charged the domestic tariff. 
The effectiveness of the tariff structure on 
services the poor is discussed in Chapter 4.
23 However, NWSC data on operational costs and collected revenues showed that the Operating Cost Coverage Ratios (OCCRs) for 2004, 2005, and 2006 were 77 
percent, 76 percent, and 83 percent, respectively, suggesting that the NWSC required significant external subsidies to cover basic operation and maintenance (O&M) 
costs. However, these increased to 134 percent, 124 percent, and 134 percent in 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively.
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Table 5: Kampala water prices in 2008–09
Type of connection Water tariff/m³ Water tariff/m3
 (UGX) (US$)
Presidential Pledge (no service charge) 784 0.31
Public water points (PWP) 867 0.34
Domestic (individual household) connection 1,341 0.53
Institutional/government 1,651 0.65
Commercial less than or equal to 1500 m³/month 2,085 0.82
Commercial greater than 1500 m³ /month 1,697 0.67
Average weighted water tariff  1,561 0.61
3.4.3 Component 3: Pro-Poor Targeting
Given the need to continue to improve service 
provision (and coverage expansion to meet the 
MDGs) to poor settlements in Kampala, and 
given that the Affordable Connections Policy 
implemented by the NWSC since 2004 was not 
deliberately focused on poor households, the 
NWSC has developed a new way of targeting 
poor households with support from the GPOBA, 
a World Bank administered trust fund (see Box 3). 
This project was initiated in 2008. A description 
of the approach is included to illustrate the 
continued improvements made to the NWSC 
pro-poor strategy.
3.5 NWSC’s Pro-Poor Strategy 
Delivery Mechanisms 
3.5.1 Mechanism 1: Pro-Poor Unit
Following the implementation of the Affordable 
Connections Policy, there was limited 
coordination of the NWSC’s activities in the 
unplanned and unserved settlements. In fact, a 
situational analysis report undertaken as part of 
the German Development Agency (KfW) funded 
project in Kisenyi-Ndeeba by Beller Consult 
(2006) states that:
•	 The	NWSC	was	focused	then	only	on	
commercial efficiency and profit.
Box 3: Geographic targeting of poor households
The NWSC, with support from the GPOBA, is currently pilot testing 
a geographically targeted program in which subsidies are provided 
to the Corporation on the basis of the provision of agreed number of 
outputs, including public and domestic yard taps in the areas where 
the poor live, with the added condition that they should be working 
at the end of 12 months of service. The project was initiated in 2008 
to demonstrate that performance-based subsidies are an efficient 
demand-based financing mechanism to extend services to the poor in 
designated (geographically targeted) areas.
The target is to provide 19,070 yard taps, 205 conventional PWPs, 
and 615 PWPs with prepaid meters in different slum areas. Increasing 
the access of piped water to the poor will lead not only to economic 
benefits by reducing the opportunity cost of water but also result in 
better health and hygiene for the poor. 
The project uses a grant of $2.85 million and will reimburse 60 percent 
of the amount spent on the project in the form of OBA subsidies (upon 
successful delivery of outputs), while 10 percent is paid for by the 
beneficiaries as user contribution, and the remaining 30 percent will 
be financed by the NWSC. However, the NWSC has to prefinance all 
investment costs (that is, 90 percent of the total cost), consistent with 
OBA principles. The Corporation is also responsible for funding all new 
network reinforcements or secondary network extensions.
To date 6,000 of the intended yard tap connections have been made 
as the poorest households (targeted by the subsidy mechanism 
available to the NWSC through the GPOBA) are living amongst 
nonpoor or less poor households (for which no subsidy is available). 
Given the difficulty with conventional PWPs, the NWSC is going to 
continue implementing yard taps and prepaid PWPs only. The likely 
benefit to poor households is expected to be high as the project is 
specifically targeting poor households in designated settlements of 
Kampala.
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•	 There	was	no	specific	pro-poor	policy.	
•	 The	poor	are	perceived	as	risky	customers	
for a number of reasons including 
vandalism, low consumption, need for 
watermains extensions, and difficulties 
with land tenure certificates.
With support from donors and development 
partners, the NWSC established an Urban Pro-
Poor Branch in 2006 to address the following 
objectives: 
•	 Develop	and	implement	tangible	pro-
poor policies, procedures, indicators, and 
targets.
•	 Facilitate	provision	of	adequate	
infrastructure in informal settlements.
•	 Set	up	strategic	alliance	with	stakeholders	
and increase networking with development 
partners.
•	 Implement	a	pro-poor	approach	in	NWSC	
structures and provide an internal formal 
feedback mechanism.
The NWSC’s Urban Pro-Poor Branch was set 
up to promote, plan, coordinate, and manage 
service provision to unserved (poor) settlements 
throughout the NWSC’s 23 service areas. The 
unit/branch is set up as an individual internal 
advisory business and therefore has internal 
targets, both at business and staff levels. 
The Urban Pro-Poor Branch has a limited 
number of seven staff, including O&M engineers, 
billing and revenue collection specialists, 
socioeconomists, and customer care staff. The 
team is led by a socioeconomist. 
Since its inception, the Branch has become 
a coordination point for the organizations 
(including donors, local authorities, and NGOs) 
working for the poor and takes up the issues 
of the poor with the commercial branches. The 
branch coordinates and oversees the pro-
poor mechanisms deployed by NWSC (see 
paragraphs 3.5.2-3.5.4)
3.5.2 Mechanism 2A: Public Water Points 
and Kiosks
PWPs and water kiosks were the initial response 
by the NWSC and the KCC to the challenge 
of delivering water services to slums. They 
constituted the first refuge of the slum population 
when they were afflicted with diseases such as 
cholera and diarrhea. The establishment of PWPs 
and kiosks helps in expanding access of water 
services to the poor as they generally cannot 
pay for connections due to high costs or legal 
difficulties associated with land tenure (discussed 
earlier in the report). Initially, a PWP is supposed 
to cater for 25 households, serving between 
150 and 200 people. The NSDS survey of 2008 
shows that 26 percent of the people in urban 
areas obtain water from public taps, which 
includes PWPs, kiosks, Presidential taps and 
prepaid taps.
The initial trend of construction of kiosks was 
started by the KCC in the 1990s with the help 
of donor agencies and the connections were 
provided by the NWSC but, as the trend caught 
on, the number of kiosks increased fast. Other 
agencies and NGOs also started to make their 
own kiosks. All these are connected by the 
NWSC and provided with a water meter. 
Often kiosks are managed by a private individual 
(or kiosk operator), who is generally the person 
who has donated the land, or his/her agent. The 
operator generally sells water at the market price 
(not the NWSC price) but this is not regulated, 
and the usual unit of water is a 20-liter jerrican. 
Field visits revealed that the price charged per 
jerrican of water ranged from UGX50 to 30024 
($0.02 to 0.12 per jerrican, or between $1.0 and 
$6.0 per m3)—depending on availability. The price 
is highly influenced by continuity of water (that is, 
interruptions), seasonal variations (and presence 
of alternative sources), and competition from 
other water sellers). The average price charged 
per jerrican was between UGX50 to 100 ($1 to 
24 This equates to $0.02 to $0.12 per 20-liter jerrican, or $1.0 and $6.0 per m3.
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$2 per m3), compared with the NWSC’s tariff at 
PWPs/kiosks of UGX867 per cubic meter ($0.35) 
or UGX17 ($0.007) per jerrican. Thus the poor 
were charged a disproportionate amount for 
purchasing water at privately managed kiosks, 
and were not benefiting from the intended 
consumption subsidy available at PWPs/kiosks 
through the differentiated tariff structure. 
3.5.3 Mechanism 2B: Presidential Pledge 
(Yellow Water) Taps
Another delivery mechanism was launched during 
the presidential election campaign in Uganda 
(2006), called the Presidential Pledge taps (yellow 
in color). 
Presidential Pledge taps are similar to PWPs/
kiosks in all respects except that they are exempt 
from service (meter rental) charge (but not 
basic water charge). Thus, one cubic meter of 
water costs UGX784 ($0.31) as compared with 
UGX867 ($0.34) at a conventional PWP managed 
on behalf of the NWSC. However, it is not clear 
why the meter rental charge was dropped only 
for Presidential Pledge taps and not across the 
board in poor settlements.
According to the NWSC, the Presidential 
Pledge (yellow) taps were obtained following 
recommendations by political (elected and not 
elected) leaders in the communities. The “PP” 
denomination is only visible on the NWSC’s 
customer database according to the date at 
which the PP tap was applied for and made. 
3.5.4 Mechanism 2C: Yard Taps
There are two types of yard taps: domestic yard 
taps are those used only by a household or a few 
families; shared yard taps are similar to PWPs 
and thus shared by many more households. 
Effectively shared yard taps are the same as 
PWPs in that they are used by many households, 
but they are still located in someone’s yard rather 
than on the street or on public land like PWPs. 
The NWSC considers that the ratio of shared to 
individual yard taps is approximately 50:50. 
A domestic connection is supposed to cater 
for a household of an average of six persons. 
However, a yard tap is usually used by up to 15 
people. Most of the connections are located 
outside the house and water from these is sold to 
the citizens at the prevailing market rate. 
The NWSC is able to monitor the consumption 
of yard taps and can decide, based on this 
level of consumption, whether the yard tap is 
actually used by a large number of people or not. 
This assessment is followed by a site visit by a 
representative of the Urban Pro-Poor Branch. If 
it is deemed that the yard tap is, in fact, being 
used like a PWPs (that is, it serves more than 
just two or three households), then the NWSC 
automatically applies the PWP tariff so that the 
intended consumption subsidy reaches the poor. 
3.5.5 Mechanism 2D: Public Water Points 
with Prepaid Water Supply Meters
Given the difficulty in collecting revenue from 
some of the PWPs/kiosks (whether these are 
community taps or yard taps), the NWSC started 
pilot-testing the use of approximately 300 prepaid 
water supply PWPs/kiosks in July 2008. 
This was carried out with funding and technical 
assistance from KfW under the Kampala Water 
and Sanitation Program phase 1. The premise is 
that customers have to obtain electronic tokens 
and ensure that these are credited, in exchange 
of which they can redeem this credit for drinking 
water at designated prepaid PWPs/kiosks. 
Early results show that the prepaid water 
supply system, whilst more expensive than a 
conventional PWP, offers significant benefits 
both to NWSC and poor customers. An 
early assessment of these prepaid supplies 
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indicates that the supply is available 24x7 to 
poor households and that they are an effective 
means of transferring the consumption subsidy 
to poor households, by removing the middle 
man effect. Security and cleanliness of the apron 
is ensured by NWSC staff in conjunction with 
representatives of the communities within which 
© Samson Gitonga
the prepaid supplies are installed. The exact 
arrangements are, however, still being tested. 
More commentary on the perceived strengths 
and weakness of the prepaid metering system is 
included in Chapter 4. 
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of the Pro-Poor 
Policies on the Poor 
in Kampala
4
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This Section presents the findings of the 
assessment of the impact of the pro-poor 
policies on the poor in Kampala, including an 
assessment of the following: coverage increase, 
unit consumption, distance to supply and waiting 
time, affordability, NRW, and socioeconomic 
impact. 
Whilst the NWSC was able to exceed the targets 
it set out in the Affordable Connections Policy 
Document (see below), it has been unwilling or 
unable to set up the dedicated and ring-fenced 
New Connections Fund, probably because it was 
not receiving sufficient revenue from customers 
to cover all O&M costs, but also because it was 
not forced to do so by the MoWE. In addition, 
whilst the number of new PWPs and yard taps 
has exceeded their initial targets, the NWSC is 
still facing a huge issue with nonpayment in poor 
settlements, so much so that the Corporation is 
now planning to retrofit all PWPs to prepaid water 
supply PWPs. This is discussed in more detailed 
later in this Section. 
Where appropriate, recommendations are made 
at the end of the Section on how the NWSC and 
GoU could improve the effectiveness, efficiency, 
and equity of the various elements of the pro-
poor strategy such that more benefit accrues to 
poor households.
Table 6: Yearly connection targets of the Affordable Connections Policy (2004)
Customer category Number of new New connections 
 connections as % total 
Public water points 280 2%
Domestic 11,900 85%
Government/institutions 420 3%
Commercial/industrial 1,400 10%
Total 14,000 100%
Note: No specific targets are included for yard taps as these are considered to be similar to domestic 
connections. In practice, therefore, the number of yard taps will be included in the total number of new 
domestic connections.
The methodology used and data collected for 
analysis are presented in Section 1.3 of this 
report. 
4.1 Assessment of Coverage Increase
The NWSC’s Affordable Connections Policy 
provides yearly targets for increasing the number 
of connections, by customer category. This is 
shown in Table 6, for the whole of the NWSC 
service area.25
4.1.1 Overall Growth in Total Connections 
and Population Served
Overall there has been a significant increase 
in the total number of connections (including 
individual house connections, PWPs, and yard 
taps) throughout Kampala: from 59,000 in 
2004 to 146,000 in 2010. This is a significant 
achievement and is a testimony to the NWSC’s 
ability to adapt the size and management of its 
operations to increasing numbers of customers, 
improve billing and revenue collection, and 
manage larger operations (a larger network 
with more bursts, greater losses, and more 
maintenance work). The Corporation increased 
the size and the efficiency of its operations in 
parallel with increasing the number of customers. 
25 Note that no specific data is available for Kampala only. 
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It is considered that the organizational structure 
of the NWSC (with IDAMCs and individual staff 
performance contracts) has contributed to these 
improvements.
The growth of NWSC connections from 2002/03 
to 2009/10 in Kampala area is shown in Table 
7, in parallel with a population growth of about 4 
percent (except between 2007 and 2008 where 
it exceeded 10 percent). Coverage of piped 
water supply has increased from 62 percent to 
74 percent during this period, and has remained 
stagnant at 74 percent since 2008, despite the 
significant increase in connections. This may be 
due to high population growth or to the fact that 
fewer households are sharing connections. 
However, in net terms this means that the NWSC 
has managed to increase coverage at a rate of 8 
percent points greater than population growth. 
This data is presented in Figure 2. The graph 
clearly shows the increase in total water supply 
connections from 2004/05, which is directly due 
to the Affordable Connections Policy. The rate of 
Table 7: Growth in NWSC connections in Kampala (2002/03 to 2009/10)
Year Total no. of Total % growth in Population % growth in Water supply
 connections population population served population served coverage
2002/03     50,302  1,208,544  749,297  62%
2003/04 59,022 1,255,341 17% 810,865 4% 65%
2004/05 72,231 1,302,138 22% 872,433 4% 67%
2005/06 93,305 1,351,619 29% 946,133 4% 70%
2006/07 105,531 1,402,981 13% 999,892 4% 71%
2007/08 119,897 1,554,818 14% 1,150,565 11% 74%
2008/09 132,882 1,635,744 11% 1,177,735 5% 72%
2009/10 146,109 1,716,669 10% 1,277,407 5% 74%
Increase in population served (2004-2010) =   466,542  
Note: * Data obtained from NWSC’s Annual Report 2009/10, calculated average between two successive periods. 
increase in connections from 2004 onwards is 
double that of the pre-2004 period (14,500 and 
7,000 new connections per annum, respectively). 
However, the rate of increase is dependent on 
demand and the NWSC’s ability to implement 
these new connections, both from the technical 
(procurement, construction, availability of 
sufficient water supply in the area) and financial 
(mostly the availability of funds in the new 
connection fund) aspects. NWSC management 
set (and therefore limited) yearly targets of 
approximately 10 to 15,000 new connections 
per year (post-2004). This is considered prudent 
given the limitations on the water network and 
water production capacity, as well as the NWSC’s 
own ability to carry out these connections. In 
addition, it is considered that much higher rates 
of connections would have been achievable if 
there had been large scale investment programs 
for mains rehabilitation, mains extensions, and 
water supply capacity increases—in parallel with 
the new connections. This is discussed in Section 
4.2. 
(*)
(*) (*)
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X  Rate of new connections (pre 2004): 7,000 per year
Y  Implementation of the Affordable Connections Policy (2004)
Z  Rate of new connections (post 2004): 14,500 per year
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Figure 2: Total water supply connections in Kampala (2002 to 2010)
Before 2004, the NWSC used to charge 125,000 
Shillings (US$75 at the then exchange rates) as 
the basic connection charge and request users 
to pay for and undertake their own length of 
connection. This would cost another $200–300, 
thus amounting to a total cost of $275 to $375. 
It is considered that the NWSC’s customer base 
grew only slowly prior to 2004 because of these 
large costs. 
As the charges for the basic half-inch (standard 
domestic) connections were reduced from 
UGX125,000 to 59,000 (basic charge of 
UGX50,000 + 18 percent VAT, representing 
US$35), the most important result of this 
Affordable Connections Policy was that a large 
section of those consumers who could not pay 
one time (upfront) connection charges, could now 
afford safe on-premise piped water. This led to a 
doubling of the number of connections over the 
period 2004 to 2009.
Table 8 and Figure 3 summarize the results of 
the National Service Delivery Survey which was 
undertaken in urban areas26 of Uganda by the 
UBOS in 2008. Overall, compared to the same 
survey that was prepared in 2004 prior to the 
start of the pro-poor policy, it seems that:
•	 The	proportion	of	households	using	
unimproved sources of water in urban 
areas has reduced—both during the dry 
and wet season.
•	 The	proportion	of	households	using	
piped water in their dwellings (that is, 
house connections and/or yard taps) has 
reduced—from 9 percent in 2004 to 5 
percent in the dry and wet seasons of 
2008, respectively. 
•	 The	proportion	of	households	that	have	
access to water in their compounds has 
increased from 13 percent to 15 percent in 
2008. Similarly there has been a significant 
increase (+16 percent) in the proportion of 
households with access to water “outside 
their compound”: this is interpreted as 
PWPs/kiosks.
•	 The	proportion	of	households	using	
alternative sources of water (unimproved) 
has been reduced by half, from 12 percent 
in 2004 to 6 percent in 2008, with less 
marked difference between the dry and 
wet season. 
The following Sections present a more detailed 
assessment of coverage increase from yard taps, 
PWPs, and prepaid water supply PWPs.
 
26 Neither the NSDS of 2004 nor that of 2008 presents results for Kampala only. 
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Table 8: Sources of drinking water in urban areas for dry and wet seasons (NSDS, 2008)
National Service Delivery Survey Dry season  Wet season
 Water for drinking Difference  Water for drinking Difference 
Water source (urban only)  since 2004  since 2004
Piped water in dwelling 5% -4% 5% -4%
Piped water in compound 14% 2% 13% 2%
Piped water outside compound 16% 16% 15% 15%
Public tap 26%  24% 
Borehole, protected spring, gravity flow scheme 31% -8% 24% -9%
Rain water 0% 0% 12% -1%
Unprotected source 4% -4% 3% -3%
Lake, river, stream, pond, dam 1% -2% 1% -2%
Other 1% 1% 1% 1%
Total 100%   100%  
    
Breakdown (improved/unimproved)    
 Water for drinking Difference  Water for drinking Difference 
Water source (urban only)  since 2004  since 2004
Improved 94% 5% 95% 4%
Unimproved 6% -5% 5% -4%
Total 100%   100%  
4.1.2 Growth in Domestic Yard Taps 
and PWPs
Data were obtained from the NWSC’s Billing and 
Commercial Department on the number and type 
of new connections in each of the 117 known 
poor areas of Kampala from 1998 to 2011—as 
a means to assess the average rate of new 
connections in poor settlements before and after 
the pro-poor policies. The data included the date 
of installation of each connection (installation 
dates older than 1998 are shown as having been 
made in 1998). 
As shown in Table 8, over the period 1998–2011, 
the NWSC carried out 16,198 connections in 
the poor settlements of Kampala: 14,668 yard 
taps and 1,530 PWPs. Between 2004 and 2010, 
however, 6,793 yard taps and 1,032 PWPs 
were constructed; see Table 8 and Figure 3—
both show that the rate of new connections 
almost doubled in 2005–06 when the Affordable 
Connections Policy was rolled out. However, from 
2009 the rate of new connections fell back to its 
pre-2004 level although the total number of new 
connections in Kampala (domestic, industrial, 
and institutional) increased rapidly year on year. 
In fact, the annual target of 280 new PWPs in 
poor settlements projected by the Affordable 
Connections Policy has been met only over the 
period 2005–09 and has since then fallen back 
to pre-2004 levels, to about 70 PWPs par year. 
Table 8 and Figure 3 also show that the NWSC at 
the time was already connecting about 700 yard 
taps and 60 PWPs per annum. 
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Table 9: Total number of new connections (per annum and cumulative) from 1998 to 2011 in Kampala
Year Total number of Total number of
 yard taps per annum PWPs per annum
1998 3,271 103
1999 499 27
2000 581 69
2001 700 69
2002 585 56
2003 758 65
2004 728 57
2005 1,269 129
2006 1,538 430
2007 1,303 240
2008 1,063 91
2009 851 66
2010 769 76
2011 753 52
Grand total 14,668 1,530
From the ACP 2,405 663
Thus, the Affordable Connections Policy has 
directly led to the construction of approximately 
2,400 yard taps and 660 PWPs between 2004 
and 2010. This means that approximately 4 
percent of total new connections over the period 
directly benefited poor households—or potentially 
approximately 144,000 persons. 
Table 10 shows the average number of new 
connections per annum from 2004 to 2010. 
The Table also shows that the NWSC’s targets 
(shown in Table 6) have consistently been met 
and/or exceeded, for all customer categories.
However, the figures shown in Table 10, in 
particular for PWPs, hide the difficulty which the 
NWSC faces with providing working solutions 
in poor settlements in Kampala. Figure 4, which 
is based on NWSC billing data, shows that as 
of end of 2010 a noticeable proportion of new 
connections in the poor settlements were inactive: 
21 percent of yard taps and 53 percent of PWPs. 
Although the  percent of inactive connections is 
reducing from one year to the next due to the fact 
that apparent debts are written off by the NWSC, 
the  percent of inactive PWPs has frequently been 
greater than 60–70 percent in 2005–06 (and up 
to 80 percent in earlier years, for example, 1999 
and 2000). This highlights the difficulties faced 
by the NWSC in the management of PWPs and, 
therefore, extending water supply services to low 
income settlements via PWPs in Kampala. 
The main challenges faced by the NWSC when 
providing PWPs is the nonpayment of the monthly 
water bill, which leads to immediate disconnection 
while the accounts stay on the customer 
database until the debt is deemed irrecoverable 
and written off.
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Table 10: Actual number of new connections per annum (2004 to 2010) for NWSC
 Target/year Actual 2004–10
Connection Number of new New Number of Number of Rate per New
category connections connections connections, connections, year connections
  as % total 2004 2010  as % total
PWPs 280 2% 3,114 7,748 772 3%
Domestic 11,900 85% 85,717 194,848 18,189 77%
Government/institutions 420 3% 4,261 6,686 404 2%
Commwercial/institutions 1,400 10% 11,850 36,977 4,188 18%
Total 14,000 100% 104,941 246,259 23,553 100%
Note: Based on NWSC Annual Reports (although data for 2004 were extrapolated). The total number of connections relates to the 
whole of NWSC’s service area.
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Table 11 shows an estimate of the total number 
of beneficiaries of new PWPs and yard taps 
in poor settlements since 2004. The estimate 
takes into account the fact that the NWSC was 
already providing approximately 700 yard taps 
and 60 PWPs per annum before the Affordable 
Connections Policy was implemented.
Thus Table 10 before this shows that, whilst only 
4 percent of the new connections provided in 
Kampala via the Affordable Connections Policy 
were made in poor settlements, 21 percent of 
the beneficiary population was in fact in poor 
settlements. 
It is considered that had so many PWPs and 
yard taps not been disconnected/were inactive 
due to nonpayment, the impact of the Affordable 
Connections Policy in poor settlements may have 
been much bigger (at about 31 percent of the 
total beneficiaries). 
The assessment concluded that the marked 
slow-down in the rate of new connections in poor 
settlements after 2009 is due to a combination of 
the following:
•	 Reduced	willingness	from	the	NWSC	to	
provide PWPs without more involvement 
from the community (for example, 
socioeconomic surveys, ATP and WTP 
studies, customer education, and 
community participation). However, since 
2007 and the setup of the Urban Pro-Poor 
Table 11: Estimate of the total number of poor beneficiaries of the Affordable Connections Policy (2004–10) in Kampala only
Level of service Increase from 2004 to 2010 % inactive People served Beneficiaries
Yard taps 2,405 18% 18 35,498
PWPs 663 36% 150 63,648
   Sub-total= 99,146
Total increase in population served (see Table 7)   466,542
Total % poor beneficiaries over total beneficiaries   21%
Branch, the Corporation is spending more 
time planning for the provision of PWPs. 
This has been followed by a significant 
reduction in the number and proportion of 
inactive accounts (see Figure 4).
•	 Inadequate	network	coverage	in	the	poor	
settlements, which means that the number 
of yard taps and PWPs is also low in these 
areas. The new connections need to be 
supported by corresponding water mains 
extensions and/or water supply capacity 
increases that are not materializing as 
quickly as anticipated/needed. 
•	 Difficulties	with	providing	poor	households	
in informal settlements with connections—
yard and/or PWPs, because of the 
unavailability of suitable land. 
In view of these challenges, the NWSC is 
currently piloting prepaid water supply systems 
with a view to replicating these at scale—and 
gradually replacing all yard taps and PWPs with 
prepaid water supply PWPs.
4.1.3 Prepaid Water Supply PWPs
The NWSC is currently pilot-testing the 
installation and use of, as well as customer 
satisfaction with, prepaid water supplies, 
mainly in Kisenyi I and II, and Ndeeba. This new 
approach started in 2008. To date, 300 prepaid 
water supply PWPs have been installed. This is 
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very slow progress and is attributed (in part) to 
the long lead line in procuring (importing) prepaid 
water supply meters. Prepaid water supply PWPs 
have principally been installed in areas where 
there was limited number of yard taps and a high 
number of inactive conventional PWPs.
Although it is too early to analyze the impact of 
these prepaid water supply PWPs, some lessons 
are appearing. The advantages of the prepaid 
PWPs include:
•	 The	system	is	convenient	and	more	
customer-friendly as it eliminates the need 
for an operator who is likely to apply a 
mark-up on the NWSC tariff, and who 
is unlikely to work 24x7. Therefore, the 
prepaid PWPs ensure that poor households 
really benefit from the consumption subsidy 
embedded in the tariff. 
•	 It	virtually	eliminates	disconnection	of	
the community due to nonpayment of a 
single individual (for example, the kiosk 
operator), thus making it a favored option 
for the NWSC. From the point of view 
of the consumer it eliminates the fear of 
inflated bills, or paying bills in arrears. In 
the daily cash economy of the poorest of 
the poor, prepaid water supply systems 
are considered as a relief by consumers as 
captured from the FGDs.
•	 For	the	NWSC	it	represents	an	opportunity	
to achieve 100 percent collection efficiency 
which is a significant improvement on the 
poor performance of conventional PWPs. 
The NWSC is considering using the prepaid 
approach with large government and 
institutional customers—to improve cash 
flow from these customers. 
•	 Finally,	it	is	considered	that	the	prepaid	
supply systems encourages water demand 
management on a daily basis in the 
household and discourages wasteful use of 
water.
However, the study consultations on the prepaid 
water supply system highlighted a number of 
challenges, including: 
•	 The	major	drawback	is	the	very	high	
price of each of the prepaid water supply 
systems (about $1,350 compared to $380 
for a PWP and $170 for a yard tap) and 
the need to fund them through grants (that 
is, the cost of the prepaid meters cannot 
yet be recovered through the pro-poor 
tariff). In the long run a suitable funding 
mechanism is required if the prepaid water 
supply PWPs are to be used at scale.27
•	 Difficulty	to	locate	the	prepaid	PWPs	on	
suitable land. Due to the private nature 
of land in most slums, it was not always 
possible to find a willing landlord who 
would offer free land for establishing a 
prepaid PWP. This may have been due 
to the fact that the initial prepaid PWPs 
were not seen as usable given that the 
number of tokens was limited. In addition, 
they may have been considered as lost 
income—since they are not managed by 
individuals. Later as the number of tokens 
increased the reluctance of landowners to 
part with land reduced.
•	 Difficulty	with	setting	up	the	supply	chain	
of tokens such that these are sold en 
masse at a large number of locations/retail 
outlets. 
The initial success of prepaid PWPs has been 
such that the contractual outputs of the GPOBA-
funded project has been recast to support 
more prepaid PWPs. The project is now going 
to establish 2,300 PWPs with prepaid meters, 
estimated to serve in total 350,000 poor people 
in Kampala. As a comparison, the project is also 
going to provide 6,000 new yard tap connections 
(serving 90,000 people) and 200 new PWPs 
(serving 30,000 people). This is summarized 
below.
27 However, the GPOBA-funded project is showing that prepaid PWPs are more cost effective than yard tap connections: average of $5.5 per capita for prepaid PWPs 
against $7 for shared yard taps.
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4.1.4 Effectiveness of the New     
Connections Fund 
NWSC senior management indicated that the 
New Connections Fund had not been ring-
fenced, and that revenues collected through 
the surcharge were not necessarily utilized for 
expansion of connections. The Corporation 
reports that the funds were not earmarked for 
new connections because the approach met with 
competing demands of a commercial nature, 
including assets renewal (buying pumps), rising 
cost of chemicals, electricity, and inflation.
It is precisely because utilities always have 
competing needs for available resources 
(especially when the utility is not recovering all its 
operating costs from customer’s bills—as was 
the case with the NWSC from 2004 to 2006) that 
the fund needed to be ring-fenced. The NWSC 
is expected to have collected approximately $12 
million from 2004 to 2010.
The fact that the NWSC had identified an 
opportunity of collecting an additional UGX4 
billion (about $2 million) per annum from tariffs 
alone meant that the size of the fund (in real 
terms) reduced from one year to the next due 
to the rising cost of materials. Thus the amount 
of funds available to pay for connections may 
have reduced from one year to the year precisely 
due to inflation—whereas the discounted cost 
of connection was kept at $35 (for domestic 
customers). 
Had an effective working New Connection 
Fund been established, the number of new 
28 Data on progress are obtained from the Mid-Term Report on the Impact and Management of Piped Water Services in Uganda (GPOBA, 2010).
connections may have been significantly larger, 
particularly in poor settlements. However, it is 
difficult to quantify how much more could have 
been achieved given that the number of new 
connections (of all types), and the ability of the 
NWSC to deliver these, are linked to water 
network characteristics (coverage, condition, 
and performance—affecting flow) and treatment 
capacity (affecting volume). 
The effectiveness of the Affordable Connections 
Policy may also have been improved had 
adequate financial support been earmarked 
sufficiently early on in the process to expand the 
water distribution network to poor (unserved) 
settlements, although increasing the number of 
connections would have undoubtedly contributed 
to increasing revenue and stabilizing financial 
performance. 
Initial lessons learned from this process are:
•	 To	ensure	that	new	connection	funds	
(once agreed by government) are set up 
and properly ring-fenced, and that clear 
procedures (including third party counter 
approval for and monitoring and reporting 
of their use) are agreed, in particular 
when the utility has competing needs for 
available resources.
•	 Once	adequately	set	up	and	ring-fenced,	
ensure that a mechanism exists for 
protecting the value of the fund against 
inflationary increases in the actual cost 
of connection, as this will lead to the 
net reduction of the number of new 
Outputs Initial OBA Progress made in 2010 in Revised OBA
 outputs the target areas (2010)28 outputs since 2010
Yard taps 19,000 119 6,000
Public water points 400 7 200
Prepaid public water points 400 3 2,300
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connections that can be made per annum. 
Two cases appear:
 Protecting the value of the surcharge 
collected via the tariff—by indexing the 
tariff on inflation. This the NWSC had 
implemented as a means to protect 
its ability to recover its operating costs 
from customers’ bills
 Protecting the value of the funds 
against increases in the cost of 
connection—which the NWSC had not 
implemented. 
•	 The	NWSC	could	also	have	stimulated	
customer demand, in particular in poor 
settlements, by offering a discounted cost 
of connection for a time limited period. 
•	 Ensure	that	the	utility	is	already	in	a	
financially stable position before any new 
connection fund is operationalized—to 
prevent the managers of the fund from 
having to subsidize basic utility operations 
instead of planned expansion.
4.1.5 Capital Investments in the Water Sector 
of Kampala
To be effective, any new connection fund needs 
to be complemented by a capital investment 
program to construct new infrastructure/water 
mains. 
This Section therefore looks at the different capital 
investment projects that were implemented 
in the water sector in Kampala since 2004 to 
provide some indication on whether these were 
sufficiently mobilized (in focus and in scope) to 
support the Affordable Connections Policy and 
services to the poor in particular. 
In urban areas the strategy of the government 
is to increase the coverage of population with 
improved water sources and provide money for 
investment in increasing capacity and distribution 
while stressing the commercial viability of the 
utility services. However, in large towns, the 
government found that there was extra capacity 
and the priority was to invest in distribution 
networks rather than extra capacity. As the 
situation in the urban water sector has improved 
over the years, the priority of the government has 
shifted to the rural areas and the annual funding in 
the urban water supply has started to decline for 
the past two years. The annual financial outlay of 
the government in the water and sanitation sector 
and in grants to the NWSC since 2001–08 are 
shown in Figure 5.
The NWSC estimated (also in Board Paper 571 
of 2004) the potential costs of connecting all 
customers (domestic and nondomestic) within 
a 50-meter radius on either side of distribution 
mains. However, these costs estimates were not 
matched with a detailed assessment of the level 
of investments required to extend the network to 
unserved areas. This assessment came later and 
was mostly undertaken through donor assisted 
projects. These are listed in Table 12.
 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Figure 5: Water sector investments in Kampala (2001 to 2008)
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Table 12: Schedule of water sector investment projects in Kampala (2002–10)
Project name
Kampala Urban Pro-Poor Project
Kampala Peri-Urban project 
Kampala Network Rehabilitation Project
Mukono Water Supply Project
Kampala Transmission Mains
Mukono Water Supply Project (phase 2)
Urban Pro-Poor Project (Kisenyi, Ndeeba)
Urban Pro-Poor Project (Kagugube)
Kampala Network Restructuring Project
Gaba Offshore Intake Pipeline Project
OBA Water Supply to the Urban Poor
Kampala Water (Lake Victoria) Water and 
Sanitation Project
Source: Data from NWSC Corporate Planning division.
Period
2002–2007
2002–on-going
2003–on-going
2003–2008
2006–2009
2008–2009
2008
2009
2009–2010
2009–2010
2008–on-going
2011–2016
Funding source
KFW and GoU
NWSC
KFW
NWSC
KFW, NWSC and GoU
NWSC
KFW and NWSC
AfDB
NWSC and KFW
AFD and NWSC
GPOBA, NWSC
NWSC, EIB, AFD, KFW, EoU 
and EU African Water Facility
Funding amount 
(US$ million)
3.3
1.5
4.4
11.1
11.6
7
2.7
1.2
N/A
7
4
250 (212m euros)
The specific pro-poor investments above were 
geared at increasing coverage in the poor 
settlements using PWPs/kiosks as principal 
delivery mechanisms. According to Table 12, the 
investments in water mains expansion (to unserved 
settlements) were mobilized in 2007—three years 
after the start of the Affordable Connections Policy. 
4.1.6 Summary of Findings on Assessing 
Increased Access
The NWSC delivered 16,198 new connections in 
poor settlements of Kampala between 1998 and 
2011. However, the real impact from the Affordable 
Connections Policy was 2,500 new yard taps 
and 660 new PWPs. Of the 466,542 who gained 
access between 2004 and 2010, however, it is 
considered that 21 percent, that is, 99,146 of 
them, were in poor settlements. 
The relatively low number of additional connections 
in poor settlements is based on a number of 
factors including:
i. The fact that poor households cannot 
afford individual connections and thus 
share access to yard taps and/or PWPs.
ii. Difficulties with the high level on 
nonpayment in poor settlements, which 
resulted in 18 percent of yard taps 
and 36 percent of PWPs having to be 
disconnected. This is considered to 
significantly affect any effort by the NWSC 
to increase coverage in these settlements. 
iii. The NWSC’s incentive to connect as 
many high consuming and able paying 
customers, rather than the poor first. The 
total number of connections in 2004 was 
low, with many government, industrial, and 
domestic customers not yet connected. 
iv. The lack of adequate water supply 
networks supplying low income 
settlements. This is coupled with the 
fact that actual investments in new 
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watermains, and funding to deliver 
additional yard taps and/or kiosks/PWPs 
came only in 2007. The total number of 
pro-poor connections may also have a 
reached a plateau given that additional 
funding for network expansion stopped 
in 2009 and that additional water supply 
capacity was required (this capacity issue, 
however, is being addressed). 
v. The focus on expanding services to poor 
(unserved) settlements is still considered 
only on a project-by-project basis instead 
of at a corporate level. A long-term 
strategic business plan is good practice, 
and would enable the NWSC to plan 
for the whole of Kampala for both water 
supply and sanitation needs. Such a 
plan would also enable coordinated and 
sectorwide development support to the 
NWSC, in particular for poor settlements. 
vi. The NWSC’s decision to not set up 
and use a properly ring-fenced New 
Connections Fund principally because 
the additional revenue collected through 
the tariff surcharge was being used to 
subsidize basic operations (in particular 
between 2004 and 2006 when the 
NWSC was recovering only 80 percent 
of its operational costs). In addition, the 
size of the fund seems to have excluded 
any provision for inflation, meaning that 
the actual number of new connections 
was being eroded by increasing cost of 
materials, and so on.
vii. Difficulties with using PWPs as a 
sustainable delivery mechanism for water 
supply services in poor settlements, 
principally due to the fact that these 
PWPs are privately registered and that 
NWSC experienced a significant level of 
nonpayment of bills. As a consequence 
a large proportion of PWPs were 
disconnected (80 percent in 2000 before 
the Policy, 40 percent in 2007 and 2008, 
30 percent in 2010, and 10 percent in 
2011). NWSC’s current strategy is now to 
replace all the PWPs with prepaid water 
supply PWPs. 
viii. Difficulties with connecting poor 
households due to the complicated land 
tenure system. However, in order to be 
more effective, the NWSC and GoU 
should have tackled these obstacles much 
earlier as these are common issues linked 
to the extension of services in informal 
settlements, where most people live.
4.2 Impact on Financial Viability
Over the period 2004 to 2010, the NWSC 
managed to significantly increase the total 
number of customers which, in turn, positively 
impacted revenue generation. For example, from 
2004 to 2010, revenues rose from UGX54 to 
113 billion (equivalent to US$27 million to $56 
million in 2010 exchange rates. This resulted in a 
corresponding doubling of operational costs from 
UGX41 to 86 billion, or $20 million to $43 million 
in the same period. 
However, given that the NWSC did not set up a 
ring-fenced New Connection Fund it is difficult 
to comment on how much of the additional 11 
percent tariff surcharge was (a) kept as revenue; 
(b) used to fund new connections; or (c) reused in 
operations. 
This significant revenue increase is due to the 
increase in new customers, but also in large 
part due to the fact that the water supply tariff 
was set to ensure an appropriate level of cost 
recovery, and that it was kept in line with sector 
price indices and inflation through yearly and 
automatic price increases. This has also meant 
that the NWSC’s operating cost coverage ratio 
has remained more or less constant at around 
130 percent.29 This is shown in Figure 6.
29 This is excellent performance as the internationally accepted benchmark for OCCR is between 130 percent and 160 percent, meaning that the utility’s revenue covers 
between 130 percent and 160 percent of its operating cost, thus allowing the utility to adequately maintain and rehabilitate the infrastructure. 
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Figure 6: NWSC financial data (2002–10)
Total water connections
Operating revenue (UGX billion)
Operating costs (UGX billion)
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(ii) Increased revenue and OCCR 
This means that the NWSC is more and more 
able to focus on expanding and providing 
sustainable services to the poor. 
4.3 Individual Consumption
One of the tenets of the government’s policy is 
to equitably provide services to all households 
(some for all rather than all for some). It is thus 
important to assess the range of individual 
domestic consumptions and to identify what 
factors appear to be limiting demand. 
4.3.1 Overall Reduction in the Unit 
Consumption of Water
Figure 7 shows the total volume of water 
produced and sold, and the total number of 
connections since 2002.
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It appears from the above that water sales have 
increased at a much slower pace than new 
connections between 2003/04 and 2009/10, 
suggesting that whilst some additional water 
was provided, the bulk of the water has been 
distributed amongst a greater number of 
customers. However, it is difficult to comment on 
whether this has reduced illegal connections or 
commercial losses. Therefore, this means that 
the average unit consumption per connection 
has reduced since 2004. In fact, the average 
unit consumption (all connections included) has 
reduced by half from 36.4 m3/month to 17.3 m3/
month between 2002 and 2010.
The graph also shows that whilst there has been 
a significant increase in connections, which have 
continued to be provided at a discounted price 
by the NWSC (within 50 meters of the mains) 
and constructed by NWSC staff, NRW is still an 
issue in Kampala, despite the two recent network 
rehabilitation projects in Kampala (in 1994–98 
with $18.5 million funding from Austria, and 
2003–ongoing with $4.4 million from KfW). NRW 
is discussed in more detail in Section 4.5.
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Figure 7: Volumes of water produced and sold vs. total number of connections in Kampala (2002 to 2010)
The rate of network expansion and new 
connections is constrained by the capacity/
availability of water. It seems that this situation will 
start improving post-2012 with the improvements 
to the Gaba I and II water treatment capacity, as 
well as the extension of the Gaba offshore intake 
pipeline. 
4.3.2 Unit Consumption by 
Customer Category
This Section considers unit consumption at 
individual house connections (poor and nonpoor), 
PWPs/kiosks and yard taps. This is illustrated (for 
the whole of the NWSC’s operations) in Table 13. 
The Sections below present and discuss 
NWSC data on unit consumption at yard taps 
and PWPs. It is considered that none of the 
households in the poor settlements of Kampala 
has an individual house connection. 
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Figure 7: Volumes of water produced and sold vs. total number of connections in Kampala (2002 to 2010) Table 13: Average unit consumption per customer category (NWSC, 2010)
4.3.2.1 Unit Consumption at Yard 
Tap Connections
The average monthly water consumption of poor 
households using yard taps in Kampala is shown 
in Figure 8. The graph also shows the cumulative 
frequency distribution of monthly consumption for 
pro-poor household connections.
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Figure 8: Average monthly consumption of poor households using yard tap connections
Source: NWSC customer database (2009).
Customer category Number of % total Volume of % total Average unit
 connections connections water billed (m3) billed consumption
     (litres/day)
Public water points 7,748 3.1% 2,210,307 4.7% 781
Domestic (incl. yard taps) 207,350 83.7% 22,966,603 48.9% 303
Institutional/government 5,664 2.3% 9,781,786 20.8% 4,731
Industrial/commercial 27,088 10.9% 11,992,093 25.5% 1,213
Total 247,850 100.0% 46,950,789 100.0% 519
Note: This data is for NWSC as a whole.
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From the above, it appears that 57 percent 
of poor households that have a yard tap 
connection use less than or equal to 3.6 m3 
per month—this equates to 20 liters per capita 
per day (lcpd) for a family of six.30 If 20 lcpd 
is the minimum recommended daily water 
consumption then this data show that poor 
households are able to access the minimum 
volume of water recommended by the WHO. 
However, this also shows that poor households 
using yard taps are restricting their water 
demand to 20 lcpd. Approximately 20 percent 
of households use more than 10 m3 per month, 
suggesting that many of these households are 
also reselling water. 
Low consumption can be attributed to a number 
of reasons, including the cost of water, network 
pressure, interruptions, and the availability of 
alternative, less expensive sources of water, as 
well as the lack of internal household plumbing 
for customers using yard taps which in turn 
Monthly consumption for poor households using public water 
points (NWSC, 2009)
Figure 9: Unit consumption at public water points in Kampala (2009)
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Less than 3.6m3 From 3.6 to 5m3 From 5 to 10m3 Greater than 10m3
limits water used for flushing and bathing. The 
NWSC reports adequate network pressures 
and 24x7 supply, which suggests that customer 
demand is fully met. Poor households are 
therefore using the amount of water that they 
need and can afford. This corresponds to 
approximately 120 liters per day for a household 
of six. 
4.3.2.2 Unit Consumption at Public 
Water Points
Only 18 percent of the PWPs show 
consumptions of less than 3.6 m3 per month 
(20 lcpd for a family of six), because they are 
shared between a large number of households. 
This explains why 60 percent of PWPs report 
consumptions greater than 10 m3 per month 
(55 lcpd). Unit consumption is summarized in 
Figure 9. These figures show that whilst individual 
household consumption might not be high, the 
low consumption at PWPs is due to the fact that 
these are shared.
4.3.2.3 Unit Consumption at Prepaid Public 
Water Points/Kiosks
The NWSC is gradually replacing all PWPs/
kiosks operated by private individuals with 
prepaid (therefore unmanned) kiosks as a 
means to ensure that consumption subsidies 
that are embedded in the tariff structure actually 
benefit the poor. Prepaid PWPs also improve 
the NWSC’s bottom line by achieving virtual 100 
percent revenue collection efficiency. Previously, 
as described in earlier Sections of the report, 
private PWP/kiosk operators used to charge 
significant mark-ups on the PWP/kiosk tariff. 
The unit consumption at PWPs/kiosks is shown 
in Figure 10. 
30 In addition, 80 percent of households use less than 10 m3, and 90 percent less than 20 m3.
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The profile of unit consumption at prepaid PWPs/
kiosks and yard taps is markedly different. 
Similar to yard tap connections, 57 percent of the 
prepaid PWPs report consumptions of less than 
3.6 m3 per month—which equates to 20 lcpd for 
a family of six (120 liters per day per household). 
This is low given that the prepaid PWPs are 
shared between many households, but may be 
due to the fact that the prepaid water supply 
PWPs are still at the pilot scale and thus not yet 
fully integrated within the communities they serve. 
However, close to 30 percent of prepaid PWPs 
report consumptions greater than 10 m3 per 
month (55 lcpd for a family of six), similar to 
normal PWPs.
One factor that may impact on individual 
consumption at prepaid PWPs is the availability 
of tokens to purchase water from these PWPs, 
and the ease with which users are able to keep 
the tokens topped up with credit. Individual 
consumption at prepaid PWPs may actually be 
higher once more such PWPs and more tokens 
are provided. 
Monthly consumption for poor households using 
prepaid PSP/kiosks (NWSC, 2009)
Figure 10: Unit consumption at prepaid public water points/kiosks 
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In addition, it is considered that low unit 
consumption at PWPs is due to the presence of 
a large number of alternative sources of water 
which are free or cheaper than the NWSC’s piped 
drinking water. Thus, if individual household 
consumption at PWPs is low—it is only reflective 
of the volume of water which households 
purchase for drinking and cooking. Other uses, 
including washing and ablution, are met with 
other sources of water, including but not limited 
to wells, boreholes, springs, and public ablution 
blocks (for example, public and private Sulabh 
toilets/showers). 
Pictures 1 and 2 illustrate prepaid public water 
points/kiosks and yard taps in Kisenyi, a low 
income but formal settlement in Kampala. The 
technology used for yard taps and prepaid PWPs 
can be the same: the only difference is in the 
location of the yard tap/PWP (public thoroughfare 
or gated private land), or the number of people 
using it, and under what name the yard tap/PWP 
is registered with NWSC. 
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1
2
Picture 1: 
Prepaid public 
water point/
kiosk in use 
in Kisenyi, 
Kampala (2011)
Picture 2: 
Prepaid private 
yard tap in 
use in Kisenyi, 
Kampala (2011)
3
Picture 3: 
Unprotected 
shallow well 
in Kisenyi 
(Kampala, 
2011)
Note: In this 
case the 
unprotected 
shallow well 
was 4–5 meters 
in diameter 
and 3 meters 
deep, acting 
like a below-
ground storage 
reservoir. The 
water level was 
2.5 meters 
deep.
5
1 2
© WSP
3
© WSP
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4 Picture 4: ‘Protected’ but unsafe spring in Kisenyi 
(Kampala, 2011)
Note: In this 
case the spring 
is deemed 
unsafe due to 
the presence 
of houses 
and latrines 
directly on top 
of the spring 
catchment.
5 Picture 5: Public and private Sulabh toilets in Kisenyi (Kampala, 2011)Note: Above left is a public Sulabh toilet, which comprises separate toilets and showers for men and women. Above right is a private Sulabh toilet which is shared by 14 families. The building comprises a toilet and a shower, shared 
between men and women. 
5
© WSP© WSP
4
© WSP
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Pictures 3, 4, and 5 illustrate some of the 
alternative sources of water in Kisenyi (Kampala).
The NSDS survey of 2008 states that the average 
water availability in urban areas is 70 liters per 
day for a household; this corresponds to 2.1 m3 
per household per month, or less than 20 lcpd 
for a family of six.
Some parishes or subcounties have become 
better connected to improved water sources, 
while others lag behind. Branchwise analysis of 
variation within Kampala of estimated domestic 
consumption by the poor of improved water 
sources in informal settlements is shown below. 
The average monthly domestic consumption for 
the poor differed between branches and ranged 
from 4.98 to 19.40 m3 per household. Higher unit 
consumption confirms the extent of water resale, 
in particular in the City Centre, Kansanga and 
Nakulabye areas. The lowest unit consumption 
was encountered in the Nansana and Mukono 
areas located on the outskirts of the city, in areas 
where watermains coverage is the lowest.
4.3.3 Summary of Findings on Assessing 
Unit Consumption
The NWSC’s significant expansion program was 
not supported by an equally significant capital 
investment program to increase water supply 
capacity, despite some significant investments 
being committed in 2011. This means that 
average unit consumption has reduced from 36 
m3/month to 17 m3/month (including all customer 
groups).
Unit consumption at yard taps seems to be the 
same as that at PWPs. This would suggest that 
the only difference between yard taps and PWPs 
is proximity to dwelling (and thus convenience). 
In both cases the majority of households (about 
60 percent) seemed to be using 20 lcpd, which is 
the minimum amount of water per capita per day 
proposed by the WHO. 
It is considered that alternative water supply 
sources in Kampala (most of which are not safe, 
see Section 2.5.1) are providing a significant 
disincentive for households to purchase treated 
water from the NWSC (treated water that is used 
for uses other than drinking, that is, washing 
clothes, and so on), and therefore an equally 
important disincentive for the NWSC to provide 
anything other than PWPs to the poorest 
households. 
It is recommended, therefore, that clear policy 
direction be given regarding the future of all 
available nonpiped drinking water sources in 
Kampala. This needs to take into account the 
negative health impact of poor households 
using these sources, as well as a realistic 
estimate of the cost of either physically closing 
or rehabilitating (including protecting the source 
catchment) all these sources. 
4.4 Distance and Time Spent
Distance to supply and collection time are two 
important socioeconomic factors in water supply 
services as they generally affect the livelihood of 
only one type of customers: women and girls. 
The NSDS 2008 confirms that 65 percent of 
individuals who carry water from the PWPs to 
the house are women. Distance to supply and 
the time spent waiting in the queue at the PWP 
therefore prevent individuals, and women in 
particular, from entering into an economic activity. 
Reducing the time taking to fetch water is, 
therefore, intimately linked with reducing poverty. 
4.4.1 Distance to Water Sources
The NSDS 2008 survey provides useful, although 
limited, information on the average time and 
distance to supply in urban areas in Uganda 
(not Kampala specifically). The report states 
that the average distance to a water sources 
was 0.9 km and 0.6 km during the dry and wet 
seasons, respectively. This is assumed to exclude 
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all households with individual connections and/
or yard taps, that is, the poorest households. 
In 2004 a similar assessment showed that the 
average distance was 1.1 km and 0.9 km, 
respectively. The slight increase during the dry 
season confirms that households are able to 
use alternative and seasonal sources at different 
times of the year, and that consumption at the 
NWSC’s points of supply (in particular at PWPs 
which individuals have to walk up to) is seasonal. 
The distribution of households by distance to 
water source is shown in Table 14. 
The fact that 7 and 4.2 percent of individuals 
in urban areas walked up to 3 km to a water 
source in 2004 and 2008, respectively, confirms 
that there are some pockets with only limited, or 
nonexistent, water supply. Individuals in these 
areas can only walk up to 3 km to obtain their 
water. The situation has somewhat improved 
though but would illustrate that there is a need to 
increase the number of water mains extensions in 
urban areas in general. 
4.4.2 Collection Time for Water
The NSDS 2008 survey provides useful 
information on average collection times for water 
in urban and rural areas. However, no data is 
available for Kampala only. Water collection time 
is proportional to distance and to the number of 
individuals that are sharing a particular access 
point (for example, a water point). Table 15 
estimates the total water collection time based on 
(a) waiting time at source; and (b) time taken to 
and from the water source. 
Table 15 shows that there has been a significant 
reduction in the total water collection time 
between 2004 and 2008, in both dry and wet 
seasons: this has been halved. However, time 
spent at the water sources has reduced the 
most: 60 percent in the wet season and 42 
percent in the dry season. This suggests that 
whilst the number of water points has increased, 
Table 14: Distribution of households by distance to water 
sources during the dry season (urban areas)
Distance in km 2004 2008
Less than 0.5 km 75.1 86.5
0.5 to 1km 14.0 8.3
1 km to 1.5 km 1.7 0.3
1.5 km to 3 km 7 4.2
Greater than 3 km 2.6 0.8
Total 100% 100%
Table 15: Average collection time for drinking water in urban areas
 2004 2008
Waiting time (in minutes) Dry Wet Dry Wet
 season season season season
At water source 38 25 22 10
Time taken to and from 
water source 22 17 13 10
Total water collection time 60 42 35 20
the pressure (and therefore the convenience) of 
water available at these water points may also 
have increased. Whilst this is not an outcome 
of any of any of the pro-poor approaches 
implemented by the NWSC, it may be the result 
of improved operational efficiency in the system. 
4.5 Affordability
This Section considers affordability of the 
discounted connection fee and the water tariff, 
and discusses the impact of the consumption 
subsidy on the poor. The World Bank reference 
document for assessing the targeting efficiency 
of connection and consumption subsidies was 
published in 2005 (Komives et al.).31 It considers 
the following:
31	Komives,	K.,	V.	Foster,	J.	Halpern,	and	Q.	Wodon.	2005.	“Water,	Electricity	and	the	Poor:	Who	Benefits	from	Utility	Subsidies?”	Published	in	Directions in 
Development, by the World Bank. 
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i. Benefit incidence, which measures how 
well the subsidy instrument benefits the 
poor versus nonpoor households. 
ii. Beneficiary incidence, which assesses 
whether poor households actually receive 
the subsidy, and the degree to which 
poor households (that could benefit) are 
excluded.
iii. Materiality, which measures the value of 
the subsidy received by the poor as a 
percentage of household income.
However, assessing these indicators requires 
more information than is available in this case 
study, including the number of households 
(poor and nonpoor) that live within 50 meters 
of the water mains and thus have access to 
the subsidy, and the number of households 
(poor and nonpoor) that, once they had access, 
actually connected to the water mains. 
This Section assesses the affordability of the 
connection fee, expressed as a percent of 
monthly income, and of the tariff, expressing the 
monthly expenditure on water as a percent of 
monthly income. 
4.5.1 Affordability of the Connection Fee
The average monthly income of poor households 
in Kampala is $48 (or UGX80,000), according to 
the NWSC and GPOBA.32 The NWSC charges 
domestic customers UGX59,00033 which is 74 
percent of the average monthly income of poor 
households. This is a significant proportion of 
monthly household income and a significant 
barrier to access to water supply services—in 
particular individual connections and yard taps. 
The NWSC, therefore, has to pay all the 
additional cost increases for pipes and materials 
due to inflation. Whilst the NWSC has protected 
itself against increases in operational costs, 
the fixed discounted connection fee is proving 
costly to administer and may explain that the 
rate of new connections in poor settlements has 
32 This equates to daily income of $0.26 per capita per day assuming a household size of six.
33 This is equal to UGX50,000 plus 18 percent VAT.
reduced since 2008, as the actual unit cost of 
connection (that is, the additional length of service 
line) increased from year to year with inflation.
4.5.2 Affordability of the Water Tariff
According to the NSDS (2008) survey, the average 
monthly household expenditure on water in 
Kampala is UGX10,960. However, the report also 
states that the people were willing to pay only 
UGX5,610 per month. The NSDS 2008 did not 
present any findings relating to average monthly 
income and/or expenditures, so it is not possible 
to comment on affordability from the NSDS 2008 
report. 
However, according to the UNHS (2005–06) 
report, the average monthly household 
expenditure in Kampala in 2005–06 was 
UGX333,704 which, using a CPI inflation rate 
index of 128 percent (from 2005 to 2009), 
corresponds to an average monthly income/
expenditure of UGX425,803 per household. This 
in turn corresponds to an average household 
expenditure on water of 2.6 percent of monthly 
income/expenditure. This is considered to be an 
acceptable level of expenditure. 
The analysis of the prepaid data shows that at 
the lowest official rates of water that is, UGX867 
per month, for achieving this minimum average of 
20 liters/day a household has to pay UGX3,121 
($1.56) per month. For an average poor family 
living below the minimum poverty level of $1.25/
day, this constitutes 3.9 percent of the monthly 
expenditure. This is also considered to be an 
acceptable level of expenditure, although the level 
of consumption is low (20 liters per capita per 
day).
However, there are only a limited number of 
prepaid meters. This means that poor households 
are continuing to purchase water from PWPs that 
are managed by private individuals who charge 
significant mark-ups, particularly when water is 
scarce. A survey of the slum areas of Kisenyi I and 
II and Ndeeba, undertaken by Beller Consult in 
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2006, revealed that the poor spend UGX4,000–
20,000 per month on water. Thus those below 
the poverty line spend up to 5–25 percent of their 
monthly incomes on water. This is confirmed by 
the NSDS (2008) survey results: 41.3 percent of 
the urban households in Kampala reported high 
costs to be a major constraint limiting access 
to safe water, probably because they are being 
charged mark-ups by middlemen.
This is acting as a further incentive for poor 
households to continue to use alternative sources 
of water that are not safe. 
The NWSC is planning to replace all privately 
managed PWPs by prepaid meters—to ensure 
that poor households can benefit from the pro-
poor consumption subsidy embedded in the tariff 
structure. 
4.5.3 Impact of the Consumption Subsidy on 
Poor Households
The differential tariff has had a positive result in 
two respects. The first is that the intended tariff 
subsidy is passed on to the poor consumers, 
and the second is that additional revenue was 
collected and reinvested into a self-funded new 
connections program. 
However, the cross-subsidy in the case of the 
NWSC is not significant as large commercial/
industrial and government/institutional consumers 
are only charged twice the PWP tariff.34 This 
is further compounded by the fact that poor 
households use a minimum amount of water. 
NSDS (2008) shows that 26 percent of the urban 
population uses PWPs or kiosks. These PWPs 
constitute 4.7 percent of the total volume of water 
consumed and account for 2.2 percent of the total 
revenue of the NWSC (Annual Report 2009/10). 
This is summarized in Table 16. 
Given the data below, it is considered that poor 
households are unlikely to make the most of the 
intended public health benefits of the consumption 
subsidy as they are only consuming a minimum 
amount of water. This is explained in more detail in 
Box 4.
Box 4 shows that the poor, who are purchasing 
water from PWPs, capture a significantly smaller 
subsidy than households that are connected 
individually, including normal house connections 
and yard taps. Furthermore, the subsidy that 
accrues to poor households is limited by the small 
volume of water that they use (on a per capita 
basis). 
34 For comparison: the ONEA in Burkina Faso has a subsidy factor of five between industrial customers and public standpipes. But the ONEA is reported to have 
exclusive right to the use, and management, of water resources in a dry environment, whereas NWSC customers can obtain water from alternative sources, if this 
becomes more economical. 
Table 16: Water market segmentation and individual consumption (2010)
Customer category Number of % total Volume of % total Revenue % total 
 connections connections water billed billed collected  revenue
   (m3)  (UGX ’000)
Public standposts 7,748 3.1% 2,210,307 4.7% 2,682,881 2.2%
Domestic 207,350 83.7% 22,966,603 48.9% 45,487,035 37.3%
Institutional/government 5,664 2.3% 9,781,786 20.8% 31,706,781 26.0%
Industrial/commercial 27,088 10.9% 11,992,093 25.5% 42,072,459 34.5%
Total 247,850 100.0% 46,950,789 100.0% 121,949,156 100.0%
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Box 4: Assessment of the quantity of subsidy that targets poor households
Using NWSC data presented in Table 16, it is possible to estimate the total quantity (in UGX) which goes 
to poor households, making an assumption that the proportion of yard taps over domestic customers is 
similar in the NWSC’s service area as it is in Kampala. By calculating the average tariff per customer category 
(using total revenue/customer category divided by volume billed) it is possible to estimate the flow of funds 
that customer categories receive or contribute. Thus it is possible to estimate the level of subsidy that poor 
households receive—per annum. This is summarized below. 
The table suggests that PWPs receive on average UGX395,000 per annum subsidy, or UGX2,631 per person 
per annum (assuming one PWP serves 150 people). Whilst it is not possible to estimate the average subsidy 
received for yard taps compared to nonpoor connections, the average subsidy for connections is UGX68,319 
per annum or UGX10,295 per capita (assuming a weighted average of 6.6 people per connection), which is 
nearly four times as much. The consumption subsidy thus unequally favors nonpoor households instead of the 
poor (PWPs and yard taps). This is due to the fact that they only use a small amount of water and that they 
are not connected.
Customer category Average tariff including Flow of funds Subsidy per
 service charge (from volume sold &  connection 
  average tariff) per annum
Public water points 1,214 3,058,131,641 394,699
Domestic 1,981 14,166,016,880 68,319
Institutional/government 3,241 (6,299,741,581) (1,112,243)
Industrial/commercial 3,508 (10,924,406,940) (403,293)
Total 2,597 - -
Furthermore, it is considered that a flat rate 
tariff structure does not provide any signals to 
consumers (all categories) to conserve (and not 
waste) water. 
To ensure that more of the consumption subsidy 
goes to poor households, the NWSC would 
need to ensure either that (a) the poor are able 
to purchase a greater volume of water; or (b) the 
differential tariff for high consumers is increased, 
or both. Increasing the tariff charged to industrial 
and commercial customers may lead to their 
developing their water supply systems, and 
thus no longer contributing to the total subsidy 
amount. However, government/institutional 
customers may be forced to contribute more to 
the total amount of subsidy. 
The most likely option for helping the poor use 
more water may be to simply improve the quality 
of drainage and sanitation in poor settlements—
an important aspect which the GoU and NWSC 
have completely sidelined. 
 
4.5.4 Summary of Findings on Affordability
The simple assessment of affordability has 
showed the following results: 
i. Despite the significant discount offered 
by the NWSC on its connection fee, the 
discounted connection fee (UGX59,000 
or $35) is still a major hurdle for the 
poorest households to access water 
supply services within their premises, as it 
represents 74 percent of average monthly 
incomes of poor households. Options 
for improving this situation may include 
(a) making the fee payable in monthly 
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installments; and (b) giving customers 
a time-limited window of opportunity 
to connect at a cheaper cost for the 
poorest. This might incentivize increased 
connections—provided households have 
access to a water network. 
ii. The differential and flat rate water tariff, 
in particular the specific PWP tariff, is 
affordable for poor households as it 
represents about 3–4 percent of their 
monthly income/expenditure. However, 
this consumption subsidy is only 
affordable for poor households because 
they use, on average, 20 liters per day per 
capita. 
iii. The targeting of the consumption subsidy 
on poor households, despite the limits on 
available data, has been found to be very 
poor—precisely because poor households 
use only 20 liters per capita per day. As 
such the greatest beneficiaries of the 
consumption subsidy are the nonpoor 
domestic customers that can also use a 
flat rate tariff structure which encourages 
liberal usage of water. Poor households 
that use PWPs benefit from a subsidy of 
about UGX2,600 per capita per annum 
(only $1.3), whereas domestic customers 
on average benefit from about UGX10,300 
per capita per annum ($5.15). However, 
given that the total number of yard taps 
(10,993 as per NWSC data) represents 
only 5 percent of the total number of 
connections, the difference is likely to be 
much greater. 
iv. Options available to the NWSC to improve 
subsidy targeting include:
•	 Increasing	the	degree	of	cross	subsidy	
to poor households, either from nonpoor 
domestic, industrial and governmental or a 
combination of the above; or 
•	 Ensuring	that	poor	households	use	
more water. This may be achieved by 
improving the sanitary conditions in poor 
settlements—and therefore permitting 
households to use more water—and 
limiting the availability of alternative sources 
of water, or a combination of the two.
4.6 Social Impact Analysis
This Chapter presents the results of FGDs that 
were undertaken with stakeholders and key 
informants, including consumers, water vendors 
and NGOs. Interviewees were asked to provide 
some feedback on the positive and negative 
impacts of the NWSC’s pro-poor policies and 
strategies. 
The group representing domestic customers 
acknowledged the increase in water availability in 
their settlements as well as the overall reduction 
of the price of water charged at PWPs. Although 
the increase in the number of connections in 
the poor settlements directly attributable to the 
pro-poor policies and strategies implemented 
by the NWSC is only 4 percent of the total 
number of new connections (as demonstrated 
earlier), increasing the number of PWPs has 
had a significant impact on poor households’ 
expenditure on water, and can be considered 
to have directly impacted the poor. In addition, 
the analysis of unit consumption at PWPs and 
yard taps suggests that poor households use, on 
average, 20 liters per capita per day—whether 
they purchase water from PWPs or yard taps. 
This is a significant finding from this study and is 
confirmed through the social impact analysis and 
group discussions. Discussions also showed high 
customer satisfaction with the prepaid PWPs, 
despite the initial difficulties with launching the 
pilots. 
The assessment also confirms a number of 
already documented concepts that are still 
very relevant to urban pro-poor water sector 
practitioners, including:
•	 The	social	connection	program	generated	
a lot of demand from poor households, in 
particular, households that had an illegal 
connection. 
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•	 Customers	fetching	water,	most	of	whom	
were women and young children, felt 
reassured that many of the PWPs and 
kiosks were managed by women.
•	 One	of	the	principal	drawbacks	of	PWPs	
is that they are usually not available after 
working hours. This confirms one of the 
key strengths of prepaid PWPs (which are 
unmanned and thus available 24hx7).
•	 Water	vendors	and	existing	kiosk	
operators are likely to see their water 
revenues reduce if water supply coverage 
is increased in the poor settlements 
within which they work. To prevent them 
from potentially vandalizing the new 
infrastructure, it is important that they 
(as well as other more formal community 
structures) be involved early on in the 
process
These are presented by customer category/group 
in Table 17. 
4.6.1 Impact of Pro-poor policy on other 
utility Priorities 
One of the stated objectives of the Affordable 
Connections Policy was to reduce NRW, 
including technical (leaks) and commercial 
losses (metering, customer billing, and revenue 
collection). This Section considers the reduction 
of technical losses only. 
The Affordable Connections Policy has had 
an undeniably positive effect on the NWSC’s 
operations and on customers, but NRW is still 
a key issue for the Corporation, in particular in 
Kampala. 
As the number of connections and the volume 
of water supplied increased and water became 
more freely available, the prices of resellers 
came down until a large number of them were 
driven out of business. Further, all the pipes 
became the property of the NWSC and the use 
of standardized materials for connection reduced 
NRW from 37.6 percent (Kampala 44.7 percent) 
in 2003–04 to 33.5 percent (Kampala 40 percent) 
in 2008. NRW is shown below in Figure 11, 
expressed in  percent of water (produced) lost 
and in m3 per km per day.
Whilst the Affordable Connections Policy 
has provided a large number of well built 
(and therefore leak-free) connections, water 
losses are potentially not coming from leaking 
connection pipes but from distribution 
and transmission mains. To this effect the 
Corporation is implementing water network 
rehabilitation programs. Commercial losses are 
also being incurred through PWPs that have 
been disconnected due to nonpayment, and 
thus becoming inactive. However, overall, this 
is considered to have a minimal effect on the 
NWSC’s operations as less than 5 percent of the 
volume of water sold in Kampala is supplied to 
the poor settlements. 
Commercial losses have been reduced 
significantly through the installation of a modern 
customer billing and revenue collection system. 
This is further likely to be improved if the NWSC 
is able to replicate prepaid PWPs in poor 
settlements. In addition, it is understood that 
the GoU wants all institutional and government 
customers to receive water on a prepaid basis. 
This is likely to be implemented in 2012. 
Improvements in NRW for Kampala (in particular, 
the level of technical losses) are expected to 
improve when the old network, especially in 
the Kampala city centre, is refurbished. This is 
expected to happen when the project under 
way supported by the European Investment 
Bank, KfW, and the European Union (EU) is 
implemented from 2012 to 2016.
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Figure 11: Nonrevenue water expressed in % of water produced and in m3/km/day (2004-2010)
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GoU policy
1. Equitable allocation 
of subsector budget.
2. Improve overall 
sector performance.
3. Enhance access by 
increasing the density 
of network/points 
and expanding to 
unserved areas.
4. Target vulnerable 
groups such as 
women, and people 
with disabilities and 
HIV/AIDS.
5. Monitoring impact of 
W&S services on the 
poor.
GoU policy
NWSC policy measure
Affordable Connections Policy.
Cut costs, improve revenues.
Not part of the NWSC’s policy but 
linked to the Affordable Connections 
Policy.
No special policy of preference to 
these groups.
Pro-poor service delivery 
mechanism: Setting up the Urban 
Pro-Poor Branch.
Comments
Allocation of sector budget to poor households has improved 
but is not considered equitable yet as the NWSC still has much 
lower per capita budget for poor households than nonpoor 
(and nondomestic). In addition, the amount of subsidy captured 
by the poor is much lower than normal domestic connections 
(including yard taps). 
This could be corrected if the NWSC developed a detailed 
business plan that covers all areas of Kampala, especially the 
poor settlements, and if a strategy is developed to help poor 
households get more water. 
Overall sector performance has been improved: the NWSC has 
significantly increased its customer base, has an appropriate 
(indexed) tariff structure, and is collecting much more revenue. 
Access in poor settlements has improved but significant mains 
extensions are still required, in particular in the poor areas that 
are on the outskirts of the city (where the poor also live). This 
could be corrected if the NWSC developed a long term business 
plan for improving water supply (and sanitation) services in the 
whole of Kampala. This business plan would identify specific 
needs, schemes, and secure funding sources.
See the point above. The pro-poor policy was initially targeted 
to serve the poor. Whilst it did benefit the poor, the majority 
of beneficiaries of the Affordable Connections Policy were, in 
fact, nonpoor domestic and other nondomestic categories (as 
evidenced by the fact that 4 percent of the new connections 
are directly attributable to the connection policy). This was 
recognized by the NWSC and its partners and led to the 
implementation of the Po-Poor Targeting Project with support 
from the GPOBA.  
The Urban Pro-Poor Branch was set up in 2007 to promote, 
plan, and improve service provision to the poor settlements of 
Kampala. This report is, however, the first assessment of the 
impact of water supply policies and strategies on services to the 
poor.
The Ministry of Water and Environment has instituted large scale 
and broad-based monitoring and evaluation processes called the 
MoWE’s Sector Performance Reports. 
4.7 Summary of Achievement of the  
GoU’s Objectives 
This Section makes an assessment of the degree 
to which the GoU sector policy has been achieved. 
Each of the components of the GoU’s and NWSC’s 
pro-poor policies and strategies are commented 
on, in the order in which they have been discussed 
(in Section 3.2.2 of the report). Comments are 
provided on the achievement of each of the 
components of the GoU’s and NWSC’s policy. 
Where relevant, recommendations have also been 
made on how each of the policies and strategies 
could be met and/or improved.
The findings are presented in Table 18 in the same 
order as they were presented in Section 3.2.2.
Table 18: Achieving the components of GoU and NWSC policy
61
GoU policy
6. Encourage 
participation of the 
poor and give them a 
voice.
7. Establishing public 
water points.
8. Pro-poor tariff 
structure.
9. Subsidizing yard 
connections serving 
as authorized public 
water points.
10. Subsidy policy.
11. Continuous 
monitoring of water 
quality.
NWSC policy measure
Pro-poor service delivery 
mechanism: Setting up the Urban 
Pro-Poor Branch.
Affordable Connections Policy.
Pro-Poor Tariff.
Pro-Poor Tariff.
Pro-Poor Tariff.
Regular monitoring of water quality.
Comments
The Urban Pro-Poor Unit was set up in 2007 and has been 
encouraging participation of poor men and women since then. 
However, to increase the impact of the Affordable Connections 
Policy on the poor, additional investments are needed both in 
water supply capacity and water network expansion.
Although a large number of PWPs were constructed. it is 
considered that as much as 50 percent of them are inactive. 
These are disconnected because private operators do not pay 
the monthly bill to the NWSC. This is having a negative impact 
on poor households (who continue to use expensive PWPs or 
alternative sources of water) despite the NWSC’s recent testing 
of prepaid PWPs. The Corporation is gradually going retrofit 
all PWPs to prepaid as a way to prevent disconnection of a 
community due to nonpayment of an individual.  
The differentiated flat rate tariff is allowing poor households 
to access water from PWPs and yard taps. The NWSC has 
set up a system that automatically considers yard taps with 
high consumption as PWPs. However, domestic customers 
are capturing a large amount of the subsidy that was in fact 
designed to help the poor, because of the limited volume of 
water sold to poor households (total of less than 5 percent per 
annum for about 50 percent of the population).
There has been a significant increase in the number of yard taps. 
However, this has been limited in time as the number of new 
yard taps has reduced post-2007 (to pre-2004 levels). This is 
considered to be due to the lack of water network coverage and 
water supply capacity. The unmet additional demand from yard 
taps is considered to be significant and can only be met with 
additional and equally significant capital investment programs.
The cross-subsidy could be improved, as it is currently low—
with government, institutions, and commercial customers 
paying twice the unit rate charged at water points/kiosks. In 
addition, the poor are not benefiting as much as they could 
from the subsidized consumption subsidy because they are not 
using much water. The GoU and NWSC to address alternative 
sources.
Water quality at the NWSC’s taps is considered to be adequate. 
However, poor households are not able or willing to use more 
than the minimum amount of 20 lcpd and thus use alternative 
sources that are unsafe. This is considered to be a significant 
public health risk as well as a disincentive for the NWSC to 
serve them until clear policy guidance is given on the future of all 
alternative sources.
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4.8 Review of Results and 
Lessons Learned
This Section is divided into two subsections: a 
description of the elements of the policy which 
have been successful, and elements which could 
be improved. 
Each subsection is subdivided into the following 
Sections: general comments on overall utility 
performance; comments on the Affordable 
Connections Policy; comments on the 
differentiated and pro-poor tariff; comments on 
pro-poor targeting; and finally, comments on the 
four delivery mechanisms (pro-poor unit, PWPs/
kiosks, Presidential Pledge taps/PWPs, yard taps 
and prepaid PWPs).
4. 9.1 Elements of the Pro-Poor Policy Which 
Have Been Successful
The pro-poor policy was successful due to the 
following factors:
General:
i. Financial sustainability as a key 
requirement for serving poor households: 
It is considered that the NWSC’s broad-
based policy has allowed the utility 
to significantly improve its financial 
sustainability (tripling revenue between 
2004 and 2010), and that this is a key 
requirement for utilities before they can 
realistically serve poor households. 
ii. NWSC’s improved operations: The 
NWSC has had to significantly increase 
the efficiency of its operations (both 
technical and financial) to plan for, 
procure, and manage the increase in 
customers. This has required employing 
more and better trained staff, setting up 
key performance contracts with staff and 
with internal independently managed 
water supply operations, applying for and 
obtaining an effective tariff structure, as 
well as installing a new customer billing 
and revenue management system. 
Component 1: Affordable Connections Policy
Increasing the number of connections across 
the board: The Affordable Connections Policy 
was an intelligent move to increase the domestic 
consumer connections base of the NWSC—it 
led to economies of scale and increased revenue 
and infrastructure investments in the long term. 
The policy was implemented through a reduction 
in connection fees by more than 50 percent while 
reducing reconnection fees by 75 percent. These 
new connections were funded by a 10 percent 
surcharge on the water tariff. It is considered 
that 4 percent of the new connections that 
were made through the social connection 
policy between 2004 and 2009 actually went 
to poor households, but that 21 percent of the 
beneficiaries were the poor. 
Component 2: Differentiated and pro-poor 
tariff/cross-subsidy in tariffs: Three types of 
cross-subsidies were utilized: differential tariff 
rates with lower rates for the poor; cross-subsidy 
across different areas; and subsidizing of new 
connections with the 10 percent surcharge in 
tariff.
Component 3: Pro-poor targeting
Geographical targeting: The recent project 
implemented by the NWSC, with support 
from the GPOBA, is proving that geographical 
targeting of poor households offers significant 
opportunities to increase coverage (volumes 
of water sold and thus financial sustainability) 
in poor, unserved areas, and demonstrates 
that performance-based subsidies are an 
efficient demand-based financing mechanism 
to extending services to poor households in 
designated areas. 
Delivery Mechanisms
i. Creation of a pro-poor branch in the 
NWSC: Creation of an organizational 
structure and institutional mechanism 
to initiate, facilitate, and continuously 
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monitor pro-poor initiatives, update 
MIS and coordinate the activities of 
different interest groups (including the 
NWSC’s own operational branches) and 
organizations was a very positive step. 
This allowed NWSC dedicated personnel 
to concentrate on pro-poor activities, a 
focus that the organization lacked earlier. 
ii. Prepaid water system: A careful and well-
thought out introduction of prepaid PWPs 
has led to its widespread acceptance by 
consumers, politicians, NGOs, and even 
the press. This has largely eliminated the 
middlemen in water supplies and made 
water affordable at the official price of the 
NWSC. However, these still need to be 
replicated at scale.
4.9.2 Recommendations for Improving the 
Pro-Poor Policy
General:
i. Development of a long-term business 
plan: The NWSC and its partners serve 
the poor on a piecemeal and project-
by-project basis. Instead, a long term 
business plan is required which coherently 
identifies needs, specific schemes, and 
funding sources for expansion of services 
to the whole of Kampala. This would 
catalyze the NWSC, GoU, customers and 
development partners. 
ii. Setting pro-poor targets for 
decentralized units and individual staff 
level: Although the NWSC has objectives 
to expand services in unserved areas, 
these are not clear targets, nor are 
these mentioned in the IDAMC and staff 
contracts. It is considered that specifying 
clear targets for expansion of services 
in unserved areas would incentivize the 
NWSC, KCC and the DWD to prepare 
detailed investment plans and strategies, 
and thereafter deliver these. These 
detailed targets would need to be included 
at business plan level (see point above). 
Such pro-poor targets could then be 
monitored and reported on at Sector 
Performance Report level by the MoWE 
and (eventually) the new independent 
water sector regulator (to be created). 
iii. Remove barrier to access caused by 
the existing land tenure system: The 
Mailo/private land tenure system in which 
owners cannot be forced to provide basic 
urban infrastructure services (including 
water, sanitation, roads, and so on) is 
acting as a major barrier of access in 
poor settlements. It is considered that 
a special law should be obtained from 
relevant public authorities, including the 
KCC and the Ministry of Lands. Some 
countries, for example, Casablanca in 
Morocco, have created a specific legal 
status for the “households with no status”, 
whereby a household without property 
title demanding service and committing 
to paying the monthly bill (and some of 
the connection costs) can be contracted 
by a service provider. The Municipality in 
this case enters into a contract with the 
service provider and the household and 
commits to pay the service provider in 
case the household defaults. In practice, 
after five years of implementation, the 
collection rates are above the service 
provider’s average and there has hardly 
been any default. Such an approach could 
have made the poor greater beneficiaries 
of pro-poor policies.
iv. Determine the future of alternative 
sources of water in poor settlements: the 
availability of alternative sources of water 
in poor settlements (up to 50 percent of 
drinking water demand) is considered to 
be a significant disincentive for NWSC 
to provide new house connections. In 
addition these alternative sources of water 
are often unprotected and unsafe. Thus it 
is considered that GoU and Kampala City 
Council adopt a clear policy for closing 
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and/or rehabilitating all these sources. 
This needs to be complemented with a 
detailed analysis of remediation works and 
management options.
Component 1: Affordable Connections Policy
v. Proper ring-fencing of the New 
Connections Fund: Revenues raised 
through the 10 percent surcharge in the 
water tariff should be sequestered into a 
properly ring-fenced New Connections 
Fund, as this would greatly improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of these 
operations, and would give NWSC 
management a clear view on what rate 
of new connections can realistically be 
achieved. This is to be supported by 
a detailed understanding of the water 
supply investment needs—to be included 
in the business plan above. The New 
Connections Fund can only realistically 
be set up once the utility is already 
financially stable (to prevent funds from 
being used for basic operations) and 
needs to be protected against inflationary 
price increases as this will lead to the 
net reduction of the number of new 
connections that can be made per annum.
vi. Legal constraints faced in getting new 
connections: For a new connection 
the NWSC insists on production of a 
land title document, a lease document 
or permission of the landowner or 
lease holder. In the present land tenure 
system many people don’t have such 
land documents and getting a water 
connection is not possible for them. The 
liberalized NWSC connection policy has 
started to take advantage of kibanjas (land 
without titles) for connection, yet it does 
not meet the requirements of the poor. 
Documents such as voters lists, municipal 
identification, ration cards, and so on, 
have been tried in other countries. Such 
an approach would lead to faster results. 
vii. Cost of connection fees for the poor: A 
number of options can be implemented 
to better help poor households obtain 
water connections. For example, payment 
of the connection fee can be made in 
installments (instead of paid upfront) 
which are reimbursed via a separate 
system through the water bill. This may be 
applicable to individual connections and/
or yard taps. Alternatively, the NWSC may 
also propose a connection subsidy that 
is time-limited, to incentivize connections. 
Even if the total number of applications 
became too high for the NWSC to 
manage, the subsidy could be made 
available until the Corporation is able to 
connect households that have already 
expressed their interest. 
Component 2: Differentiated and pro-poor tariff
viii. Improvement of the size of the cross-
subsidy: Poor households are indeed 
benefiting from a differential and flat tariff 
structure. However, the level of subsidy 
appears to be relatively low given that 
domestic, industrial and institutional 
consumers are only charged twice the 
PWP rate. In addition, it appears that large 
industrial customers who use more than 
1,500 m3/month are not included in the 
cross-subsidy. 
ix. Improvement of the effectiveness of 
the cross-subsidy: Poor households are 
not purchasing enough water from the 
NWSC and are therefore not benefiting as 
much as they should be from the cross-
subsidy. This is due to a combination of 
water supply capacity restrictions and the 
availability of alternative sources of water. 
It is considered that water supply tariffs 
are affordable to poor households except 
when water reselling takes place. 
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x. Improvements to the tariff structure: 
Whilst the benefits of the differential flat tariff 
structure are recognized, it is considered 
that the flat tariff for domestic customers is 
not conducive to water saving. Therefore, 
it is recommended that an increasing 
block tariff be set up at least for domestic 
customers. In addition, it is considered 
that the automatic tariff increase should be 
waived for public standposts. Any revenue 
shortfall could thus be funded via the 
increasing block tariff. 
xi. Unequal water tariff in slums: The 
differential tariff rates for water for PWPs/
kiosks (867/m³) and Presidential Pledge 
taps (784/m³) are not equitable for poor 
households. It is considered that the 
current PWP/Presidential Pledge tariffs be 
normalized.
Delivery Mechanisms
i. Improve marketing of, and customer 
training on how to use, prepaid tokens: 
Prepaid meter are proving to be very 
successful in Kampala (both with the 
utility and its customers). A mixture of 
conventional and prepaid connections 
seems to be the way out for many slum 
areas of Uganda. 
ii. Increase the market for retail of credits 
for prepaid meter tokens: In parallel with 
improving marketing of, and training on 
how to use, prepaid tokens, the market for 
retail of credits for prepaid meter tokens 
needs to be increased. 
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Since 2004, the NWSC has implemented a 
large-scale new connections program targeting 
all customer categories in Kampala, including 
the poor. To do that the NWSC has also had to 
improve the efficiency of its operations (technical 
and financial), invest in network rehabilitation 
and expansion projects, create a bespoke Urban 
Pro-Poor unit, and set up performance-based 
contracts with the government and with its own 
staff. However, both the NWSC and GoU have 
not ensured that a ring-fenced New Connection 
Fund was set up. It is considered that the pro-
poor policy may have had a much bigger impact 
on the poor had the Fund been set up and used. 
Overall, the Affordable Connections Policy and 
the differentiated and pro-poor tariff structure 
have had a positive impact on poor households 
in Kampala. While 21 percent of the beneficiaries 
lived in poor settlements, this policy was 
eventually used to broaden coverage across 
the board. There are opportunities to continue 
to learn from the lessons in implementing the 
Affordable Connection Policy, and to improve 
the planning and implementation of service 
expansion in unserved areas. 
Water supply coverage has increased significantly 
over the period, from 62 percent to 74 percent, 
despite a population growth rate of 10 percent. 
The total number of connections in Kampala has 
increased from 59,000 in 2004 to 146,000 in 
2010. Whilst most of the beneficiaries have been 
the nonpoor (and industries), this increase has 
had positive impacts on the poor by leading to a 
reduction in the price of resold water. However, 
the rate of new connections in poor settlements 
has sharply reduced from 2009 onwards. This 
is considered to be due to the fact that 18 
percent of yard taps and 36 percent of PWPs are 
inactive. This has prompted the Urban Pro-Poor 
Branch, with support from development partners 
(principally the KfW and GPOBA) to look for 
innovative service delivery mechanisms, including 
prepaid PWPs. This new approach is expected 
to generate significant benefits to unserved areas 
and the NWSC, providing that it is coupled with a 
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commensurate increase in water supply capacity 
and availability (mains).
Unit consumption over the period has reduced 
which suggests that, while there was some 
increase in water production and water sold, 
the bulk of the water was distributed among 
more customers. The assessment found that 
approximately 60 percent of the poor are using 
less than 20 lcpd, and that they are purchasing 
this water from PWPs. The NWSC is currently 
developing additional water supply, transmission, 
and distribution capacity. 
Alternative sources of water are widely available 
in Kampala ad are used to supplement NWSC 
supply. Coupled with a complicated system 
of land tenure, this acts as a disincentive for 
the NWSC to provide anything other than 
shared connections in poor settlements as 
unit consumption is low. There is a need for 
clear policy, customer education campaigns, 
and concrete actions to remediate all springs, 
boreholes, and wells in poor settlements, and for 
realistic management arrangements. 
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The differentiated tariff structure (including the 
PWP tariff) is considered to be affordable even 
to the poorest households. However, poor 
households are using low volumes of water for 
drinking and are therefore not benefiting from the 
cross-subsidy as much as they could. 
The level of the discounted cost of connection 
is considered to be unaffordable for the poorest 
households as it represents up to 75 percent 
of the average monthly income. Options to 
improve the level of uptake of connection, once 
adequate supply capacity is provided to unserved 
settlements, include paying for the connection fee 
(of $20 for the poor) in installments.
Finally, this assessment confirms that utilities 
which want to expand water supply services to 
unserved areas first need to focus on improving 
the efficiency of their operations. NRW continues 
to be a key issue for he urban water sector 
in Uganda, and Kampala in particular, with a 
stagnant 40 percent of water produced lost, from 
2004 to 200. This is in spite of NWSC taking 
ownership of service lines and paying for and 
undertaking all connection works. It is considered 
that major network rehabilitation works, coupled 
with investments to increase total supply 
capacity, are required.
The report demonstrates that large scale 
connection programs in poor settlements can 
be funded directly through a tariff surcharge 
once a sufficient number of large consumers 
are able to contribute to the cross-subsidy 
mechanism. However, utilities need to be able 
to invest in additional water supply capacity and 
distribution networks, and also need to develop 
specific programs that specifically target poor 
households. Ultimately, these strategies and 
programs need to be detailed in a strategic 
business plan which financiers, public and 
private, can help implement. 
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Recommendations 
for Further Study6
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This Section of the report presents options 
for undertaking more detailed research on 
specific aspects of the planning, funding, and 
implementation of the pro-poor policy:
i. Options to overcome land barriers to 
water connections; the complicated land 
tenure system locks out investment for 
poor urban households. Policy options on 
how these land barriers can be overcome 
need to be further explored.
ii. More detailed analysis of actual water 
use by source and consumption patterns 
to inform targeting. It is important to 
understand the impact of the alternative 
sources of water on customer demand 
and on the NWSC’s incentive to serve 
poor areas. More detailed assessment of 
customer demand in poor settlements, 
with guidance on how unit water 
consumption in poor settlements may be 
improved to ensure the expected health 
benefits.
iii. Models for token distribution and 
circulation for automated prepaid PWPs; 
as described, one of the challenges 
observed with the automated prepaid 
systems were adequate distribution and 
circulation of tokens. It will be important to 
develop a model to understand how these 
challenges can be overcome to inform 
scale up of prepaid PWPs.
iv. Detailed review of new connection 
applications versus new connections 
undertaken since Affordable Connections 
Policy was implemented—to be able to 
determine whether specific areas of the 
network/customers were not connected, 
or were deliberately connected at a 
later stage (for example, once the major 
customers were connected). 
v. The analysis of benefit incidence, 
beneficiary incidence, and materiality of 
consumption subsidies.
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Appendix 1: Pro-poor Services Areas in Kampala
KCCA slums GIS unit, 2010
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Appendix 2: NWSC Pro-Poor Strategy (2004)
National Water and Sewerage Corporation
Information paper dated 19th July 2004
The new policy of providing and maintaining 
service lines to customers
1.0 Introduction
This paper provides clarification on the new 
policy of providing and maintaining service 
lines to all NWSC customers. The policy was 
approved by the Hon Minister of Water, Lands 
and Environment in a statutory instrument to be 
published shortly and takes effect from 1st July 
2004.
As you are aware, until now, the policy of 
connecting a new customer is that the customer 
pays a connection fee and is also responsible for 
supplying all materials such as pipes and fittings 
necessary for connection between the supply line 
and the meter.
Under the new policy, the customer shall only 
be required to pay the normal connection fee, 
while the NWSC shall ensure that the customer 
is connected by purchasing all the pipes, fittings 
and carrying out trenching and pipe laying up to 
the customer’s meter.
The principal objectives of the new policy are to:
•	 Increase	the	number	of	customer	
connections thereby making water 
accessible to the population especially the 
urban poor.
•	 Reduce	the	level	of	unaccounted	for	water	
by reducing the incidence of leaks and 
bursts within the service lines.
•	 Ensure	standardization	in	the	quality	of	
materials.
This policy is in line with the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) of halving the number 
of persons without access to clean water by the 
year 2015; and improving efficiency in service 
delivery. The proposal is also in line with the 
principle of “some for all and not all for some”. 
2.0 The basis for the new policy
The policy of providing and maintaining the 
service lines to customers was derived from the 
following policy documents:
•	 The	NWSC	Corporate	Plan:	2003–2006	
Strategic Goals: in which it is stated 
that “the NWSC is to create funds for 
maintenance, new connections and 
network extensions as part of its strategy 
to ensure that investments and new 
connections are implemented on a timely 
basis”
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•	 The	Performance	Contract	with	the	GoU:	
2003–2006: which states that “The NWSC 
will undertake the introduction of a “new 
connection fund” mechanisms in the tariff 
policy that will help accelerate provision 
of services to the poor and also curb the 
incidence of unaccounted for water”
•	 The	Poverty	Reduction	Support	Credit	
(PRSC IV) targets which provides that 
within the period April 2004 to March 
2005, the NWSC will develop a water 
tariff structure aimed at encouraging new 
connections through the establishment 
of a connection fund. This would also 
address the access of safe water to the 
poor.
3.0 Rationale for providing and 
maintenance of service lines to 
customers
Water is both an economic and social good. 
Hence a balance needs to be established 
between access and costs of service delivery. 
The following are the main reasons behind the 
policy for providing and maintaining customer 
service lines.
i) The need to increase access of services 
to all consumer categories including the 
following:
•	 The	Urban	poor.	A	study	carried	out	by	
Maxwell and Stamp in 200235 established 
that the poor did not actually benefit 
from the subsidized rate at the stand 
posts due to the middle man effect. As a 
consequence it was recommended that a 
strategy be developed to reduce reliance 
on water points and encourage domestic 
connections by which the poor will get 
water at the true NWSC rates. The policy 
therefore aims at increasing the number of 
yard taps and domestic connections.
•	 The	industrial	sector	which	is	one	of	
the key drivers in ensuring continued 
industrialization, urbanization, and 
growth of the country’s economy. The 
implementation of the policy is expected 
to facilitate access of water services to the 
industrial sector.
ii) Need to curb the high levels of 
unaccounted for water (UfW) of which a 
significant proportion has been attributed 
to poor materials and workmanship 
by customers when carrying out new 
connections.
iii) Need to standardize materials for 
connection.
iv) Need to adequately maintain service 
pipes up to the meter and thus continually 
improve the system network.
v) The policy for providing and maintaining 
service lines to customers is widely 
accepted as best practice in service 
delivery and has been adopted by a 
number of countries including South 
Africa, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Tanzania. 
4.0 The cost of providing and 
maintenance of service lines to 
customers
The NWSC currently makes an average of about 
14,000 new water connections per annum 
according to the following breakdown:
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Table showing estimated number of new connections per annum
Estimated cost per connection (typical domestic ½” connection)
Connection category Number of new New connections 
 connections as % total
Public water points 280 2%
Domestic 11,900 85%
Government/institutions 420 3%
Commercial/industrial 1400 10%
Total 14,000 100%
4.1 Cost implications:
Based on cost scenarios generated and presented for different lengths of service pipes, the Board 
accepted the average distance of 50 meters from NWSC’s service point as ideal in terms of cost 
implications. 
Cost per connection:
The cost break down for a typical domestic water connection based on the distance of 50 meters is 
given in the table below:
Item Measurement Unit cost (shs) Total cost (shs)
Pipe size 15 mm and less (DN 15,PN 10) 50 meters 600 shs/ meter 30,000
Fittings, tees, bends etc  30,000 30,000
Saddle  6 inch  150,000 150,000
Labour 50 meter 660 shs/meter 33,000
Total   243,000
The average cost per connection of a ½ inch pipe supply is therefore estimated at Shs 243,000. This 
cost does not include the cost of a meter which has always been an NWSC cost.
Based on the model for the domestic cost estimate, the cost for the other customer categories were 
estimated as follows:
Water points/standpipes: Shs 400,000
Government Institutions: Shs 350,000
Commercial Industrial: Shs 450,000
The following table indicates the estimated annual cost of providing service lines for 14,000 new 
connections based on the mean distance of 50 meters from the NWSC service point. 
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Table Showing Annual Cost of Service Lines Within A Distance Of 50 Meters From NWSC Service Point.
Table Showing Implications on Tariff
Connection category Number new  Average cost of Total cost
 connection new connection Shs (000)
   Shs (000)  
PWP 280 400 112,000
Domestic 11,900 243 2,891,700
Government Institutions 420 350 147,000
Commercial Industrial 1400 450 630,000
Total 14,000  3,780,700
From the table above, the total costs to cover the provision and maintenance of service lines to 
customers within a distance of 50 m would be about Shs. 3.78 billion.
5.0 Implications on the tariff
In order to raise the Shs. 3.78 billion for the provision and maintenance of service lines, the tariff has 
been increased by an average of about 10% as shown in the table below. It should be noted that in line 
with the policy of re-balancing of the tariff, large industrial customers (consuming over 500 cu.m of water 
per month) have been excluded from the tariff increase. 
Customer category Water tariff Water tariff Water tariff  % Increase
 2003/04 2004/05 after 2004/05 
  5% indexation after adjustment
Standpipes 449 471 521 10.7%
Domestic 693 728 806 10.7%
Government Institutions 854 897 993 10.7%
Commercial/ Industrial
Up to 500 m3/month 1187 1,246 1,379 10.7%
500 – 1,500 m3/month 1,421 1,421 1,421 0%
Above 1,500 cu.m/month 1,324 1,324 1,324 0%
Average tariff 836 873 957 10%
It should be noted that the change in tariff is solely due to the transfer of responsibility of providing and 
servicing consumer lines from the user to the Corporation. For purposes of clarification, the table below 
shows the impact of the change on the price of a 20 liter jerrican of water. 
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Change in Price per Jerrican
Change in Water bills/Jerrican/Household: Coverage 50 meters
Band Current cost Cost/jerrican Cost/jerrican Typical bill 30 Typical bill 30 Typical bill 30
 per jerrican Cu.m with after fund (D)/200 (C) cu.m (D)/200 (C) cu.m (D)/200 (C) cu.m
 2003/04 tariff indexation Shs Shs per month per month after per month after
    Current tariff Shs indexation Shs adjustment
Stand pipe 8.98 9.42 10.42 13,470 14,130 15,630
Domestic 13.86 14.6 16.12 20,790 21,840 24,180
Comm< 500m3 23.74 25 27.6 237,400 249,200 275,800
6.0 Implementation
The Board in its two sittings on the 18th and 24th June 2004 approved the implementation of the new 
policy based on the following tenets: 
•	 The	policy	covers	only	water	connections.
•	 The	policy	will	cover	all	customers	within	a	distance	of	50	meters	from	the	NWSC	service	point.	
All materials and other costs including road reinstatement to be met by the Corporation. 
•	 The	cost	in	excess	of	50	meters	to	be	met	by	applicant.
•	 Customers	will	continue	to	pay	the	connection	fee	(e.g.	shs	50,000	for	domestic	customers)	as	a	
commitment and contribution to the service.
•	 The	tariff	is	to	be	adjusted	by	an	average	of	10%	to	defray	the	additional	costs	of	providing	and	
maintenance of service lines up to the customers meter. 
•	 As	in	the	case	of	the	electricity	industry,	all	service	lines	will	henceforth	belong	to	NWSC.	This	will	
allow more consumers to be connected to the service lines.
Following the Board approval, the Hon Minister of Water, Lands and Environment assented to the policy 
through a statutory instrument (copy attached) which shall shortly be published in the Uganda Gazette. 
As you will note the effective date of implementation is 1st July 2004.
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